Category Archives: Politik

The Contradiction in Modern Feminism

Watch as video here.

On New Year’s Eve of 2015/2016, mass sexual assaults took place against women in several cities across Germany. Most famous is the incident in Cologne, where 2000 men of Middle-eastern and North African descent sexually assaulted 1200 German women.

Coordinated mass sexual assaults by men against women should be a feminist cause if there ever was one. Yet to the surprise of most Europeans, many familiar feminist bloggers, pundits and writers across northern Europe did not come out to denounce the attacks. Instead, many talked about how these mass sexual assaults were no different from what white European men do to women every weekend at clubs, how there is rape in every culture so it would be irresponsible to just single out these Middle Eastern perpetrators, and so on.

How could we have come to a point where leading European feminists cannot bring themselves to speak out against mass coordinated sexual assaults against women? The answer has to do with what we call the contraction in modern feminism.

Feminism was originally a movement rooted in the broader values of the age of enlightenment. The foundation of classical feminism was the belief that all citizens should be treated equally by the state and be able to lay claim to the same rights, privileges and responsibilities, regardless of gender. At the time when feminism was conceived, the application of this principle meant expanding women’s rights to be on par with men’s.

The values of the enlightenment were universalist and went both ways: If men had somehow been the ones to be short-changed by society, then the same principle could have been applied to further men’s causes. Enlightenment feminism wasn’t about being a man or being a woman. It was about being equals as human beings. Enlightenment values were also individualist. If certain traditions, cultures, and religions mandated that men or women be treated differently, then these collectivist social structures had to be combated, since the individual’s free choice was unequivocally more important.

However, in recent years, feminism has also absorbed ideas from movements very different from the enlightenment. Some of the names used to describe this type of feminism 3rd and 4th wave feminism, intersectional feminism, and so on.

Where enlightenment feminism had been universalist and individualistic, many modern feminists regard the whole tradition of the enlightenment as suspicious, exclusively Western, and perhaps even imperialistic. If other cultures have different gender roles, then who are we to say they’re wrong?

In other words, the philosophy inherent in much of modern feminism has more to do with the philosophical responses and counter movements to the enlightenment, than they have to do with the enlightenment. Specifically, much of it is indebted to the philosophy of the romantic era, where it was thought that the individual’s values could not be formularized as a list of abstract rights and ideals, but were deeply rooted in culture, community, and personal identity.

In other words, where the enlightenment was universalist, rational, and impersonal, the philosophy of the romantic era was particularistic, experiential and personal. They are and were two completely different ways of viewing the world.

So where Western feminists used to be unequivocally opposed to traditions, cultures, and religions that stood in the way of their enlightenment values, the picture is now less clear cut. It is not that modern feminists don’t care about the plight of women outside of their own culture and ethnicity, as right-wingers often like to accuse them of being. Rather, it is that modern feminists tend to see the traditions, mores, and religious of individuals belonging to other cultures as vulnerable components of their identity. If these were steamrolled by Western pundits, this might result in an empowered majority culture subjugating a vulnerable minority. In the eyes of many modern feminists, lecturing people of other cultures about what values they should have can very easily border on cultural imperialism and be disempowering to minorities.

This is where the confusion comes in: Prosaically speaking, worrying about steamrolling minority cultures has very little to do with women’s rights and very much to do with an overall agenda of fighting racism, where modern feminists see themselves as the defenders of vulnerable minorities.

This is why leading feminist pundits all over northern Europe were left speechless when 2000 Middle Eastern and North Africa men stage a massed sexual assault on 1200 European women.  Obviously these men were trampling the rights of women underfoot. But they were also part of what many modern feminists perceived as a vulnerable minority culture. They wouldn’t risk being the enablers of cultural imperialism.

In this way we can see how modern feminism is trapped in a contradiction between two philosophical traditions that simply cannot be synthetized. The enlightenment one, that cares about equal rights and is rational, individualistic and universalist. And the romantic one, which places more stress on the personal, the particular, and on protecting minorities from cultural hegemony and imperialism. And this is what we call The Contradiction in Modern Feminism.

The Political Psychology of Donald Trump

Donald Trump is one of the most divisive and controversial candidates in contemporary American politics. Seen as a courageous straight talker by some and a boorish loudmouth by others, Trump has certainly instigated a number of challenges to the traditional political order.

Two characterizations concerning Trump seem to dominate the public discourse: One is that Trump’s speech patterns and judgments seem incoherent and shifting, and that he therefore must really have no political philosophy at all. The other is that Trump is a fascist and dictatorial demagogue; an ugly apparition of the 1930s rearing its head again. I think both of these characterizations are misguided and that they prevent us from getting a clearer picture of what Trump is all about.

There are two prongs here: One is the psychological properties of Trump’s cognition and personality, and the other is a matter of historical analogy.

If we start with the historical analogy, Trump is not a fascist. The precise political analogy is that he is a European style right-wing populist, akin to the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Front Nationale, Alternative für Deutschland, and so on. These parties are sometimes referred to as “far right” parties, but they are really only far-right on immigration: In matters of economic policy, they are frequently left of more traditional right-wing parties. With regards to Trump, apart from protectionism in matters of trade, we don’t yet know much about the economic policies he will favor, but one study concerning the political preferences of Trump supporters found that they supported economic policies that were significantly to the left of all other GOP candidates in the 2016 primaries. Thus with his extreme scepticism of immigration and his centrist economic policies it makes more sense to see Trump as an American version of a European right-wing populist, and not a fascist. Trump’s opponents make the legitimate point that he really doesn’t seem to care too much about rule of law, the division of powers, and the principles of the constitution. But to be fair, many left-wing candidates have also instigated unconstitutional policies, which have been upheld by judges through judicial activism and judicial review, without them getting accused of being fascists. If Trump is a fascist, then so, presumably, are they. It doesn’t hold up.

Then there is the psychological question of Trump’s personality and cognition. Trump is strikingly incoherent in his speech patterns and very often changes his opinions. For this reason, his opponents often claim that Trump doesn’t have a political philosophy at all. But to understand Donald Trump from a psychological perspective, we must distinguish between political stances and a person’s approach to politics in general.

Trump’s approach to politics can best be described as transactional and realistic. By transactional, I mean that Trump applies the logic of business to the domain of politics. While the two overlap, each discipline also has areas where their traditional reasoning styles are distinct. Now, Trump often explains this inclination by reference to the fact that he is a businessman. But that can’t be the whole story. Mitt Romney was also a businessman (and by most accounts, a far more successful one than Trump). But while Romney also applied his business acumen to solve certain political challenges, such as cost-cutting at home, he nevertheless conceded that in matters of global stability and foreign policy, a more traditional style of political reasoning would be more suitable.

Trump doesn’t agree with that – he proposes to apply the transactional logic of business to politics across the board. His own explanation – that he is a businessman – is not sufficient to explain this preference. Part of the explanation must also be found in his personality, which is that of a supreme realist. Extreme realism and the transactional outlook define lion’s share of Trump’s approach to politics. He asks: “What will the bottom-line be, and if I’m going to help you, what have you done for me lately?”

For example, the European countries have been free-riding off the defence spending of the United States for decades. Since they are allied with the US through NATO, they bank on the United States’ military being so strong that they don’t need to uphold a military that can defend their own countries. The European countries know that the United States has not been willing to leave them to their fates, since the US has an interest in keeping their part of the world stable, pro-Western and safe. But why should the United States strive to keep Europe safe? It all has to do with amorphous, long-term interests, such as containing Russia and fostering an international community that believes in liberal democracy and Western values. Thus, no American president has dared to scale back America’s engagement in Europe, even though they all know full well that the Europeans are free riding on America’s defence. But such abstract, long-term interests that have no immediate payoff now, are precisely the types of priorities that get relegated to the back seat of consciousness by Trump’s transactional and immediacy-oriented cognition. If the question is “what have you done for me lately,” the European countries have been lying on the couch, munching Doritos and watching reruns of bad sitcoms, while the United States has been busting itself working two jobs to keep both their continents safe.

In an unprecedented move among US presidential hopefuls, Donald Trump has said that under his leadership, America would not necessarily come to the aid of a NATO ally under attack. Trump says that to determine that question, he would first consider how much the ally in question has contributed to the alliance. His precise words were that he would come to the aid of an ally only “if they fulfil their obligations to us.” The transactional disposition is evident here. “We’ll only scratch your back if you scratch ours.” This is the logic of business, and not of grand scale geopolitics where superpowers may often end up with freeriding client states. Now, we’re not saying that Trump is wrong to employ this logic – that’s for you to decide. But it’s definitely wrong when people say that Trump doesn’t have an approach to politics. He’s transactional and looks to immediate reality which he perceives viscerally and without the filter of traditional morality.

The realism and transactional disposition can’t really be separated. They must be seen in conjunction if we are to understand Trump’s psyche. Nonetheless, the realism can be seen especially clearly when Trump is talking about immigration. Now most people in their morality distinguish between the world as it is and the world as it should be. But to Trump, these two are intertwined. His cognition is so reality-focused that it is reality itself that determines the morality of a given behavior. Thus, concerning the wave of terror attacks in Europe, Trump has said:

“We have problems in Germany, and we have problems in France … They have been compromised by terrorism. … They have totally been. … And you know why? It’s their own fault. Because they allowed people to come into their territory.”

In other words, he is placing the blame, not on the terrorists, but on what the most likely outcome will be from of a given type of behavior. The outcome of an action and the morality of it are inseparably bundled up together in his cognition. It’s like a certain pick up artist who once said:

“If a woman got raped, that is a sad thing. It’s a bad thing. But whose fault is it? Is it the woman’s fault? No, I’m not saying that. … But a woman can do things to reduce the likelihood that she will get hurt. If I get a BMW car right now and I leave the key inside and park it in a bad area and it gets robbed, whose fault is that? Is it the thief’s fault, or is it my fault for being a moron?”

One should not succumb here to the fallacy of thinking that just because the blame may logically belong on the shoulders of the one party or the other, then that is also how things must be psychologically in the minds of actual people. Especially not when dealing with supremely reality-oriented people like Donald Trump. The point is that in his cognition, he is not inclined to look to some imagined pie in the sky for how to relate to the world. The moral status of an action is to a large extent determined by how the world is, free of references to principles and abstractions.

This type of reasoning was also on display when Trump said John McCain was not a war hero because he was captured. Now, this is perhaps not the finest instance of Trump’s reasoning, but I select it because it shows how Trump’s cognitive style prioritizes objective reality over all other competing considerations. If the guy is such a war hero, then why did he allow himself to be captured?

Just like with his position on NATO, where the immediately evident free-riding of European states takes precedent over more long-term and amorphous considerations about maintaining an American world order, the immediate physical fact of McCain being captured trumps more abstract concerns about whether people would even sign up to defend their country in the future if that is the way U.S. presidents are going to be talking about the country’s POWs.

A third example of this supremely reality-oriented cognition can be found in one of Trump’s more recent statements about the Constitution. Faced with the rejoinder that his proposed ban on Muslims entering the United States might be unconstitutional, Trump responded:

“Our Constitution is great. But it doesn’t necessarily give us the right to commit suicide.”

Om skatter og civilisation

Af Ryan Smith

“I like taxes. With them I buy civilization,” eller den historisk præcise variant “taxes are what we pay for civilized society,” er et svar man ofte hører på denne eller hin skattekritik. Ofte slynges citatet ud som en overraskende kobling, der skulle tage de skattekritiske røster på sengen. Antageligvis mener man, at folk, der synes, at skatten er for høj, aldrig har tænkt over sammenhængen mellem skat og samfund. Men selvfølgelig har skattekritiske tænkere skrevet essays og bøger om netop denne sammenhæng, årtier før Oliver Wendell Holmes fandt på det pågældende bon mot. Bastiats essay om That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen (1850) er nok det mest berømte i denne genre. Til sammenligning er Wendell Holmes’ lille vending fra 1927.

Den lille vending er også problematisk af en anden årsag, som vi her kunne kalde “civilisationens Laffer-kurve”: Ganske vist får man civilisation af skatter, men får man altid mere civilisation af højere skatter? I så fald ville det mest civiliserede samfund jo have et skattetryk på 100%. Det er der næppe mange af de velfærdsstatstilhængere, der påkalder sig Wendell Holmes, der mener.

Hvis vi er enige om, at det optimale skattetryk ikke er 100%, hvad er det så? Wendell Holmes’ ord faldt på et tidspunkt hvor det samlede amerikanske skattetryk var 7,6%. I moderne kontekst nævnes en flad skat på 20% af og til som det mindst forvridende skattelejde. Det kunne man nok godt få de fleste af de skattekritikere, der ellers får slynget Wendell Holmes i hovedet, med på. Sjovt nok er det dog aldrig hverken 7,6% eller 20%, der sigtes til, når velfærdsstatstilhængere i moderne tid påkalder sig Wendell Holmes. Ja, oftest ligger raten mistænkeligt tæt på det nuværende skattetryk i deres eget hjemland.

Endelig er der spørgsmålet om, hvad der kvalificerer som civilisation. Mises skulle angiveligt have sagt, at minimalstaten ud over domstole og militær også havde en forpligtigelse til at opretholde en statsopera. Så lad os bare sige, at Det Kgl. Teater er civilisation. Men er Kvinfo, X-Factor, lysende bænke, cyklende julemænd og støtte til rabiate imam’er? Wendell Holmes’ udsagn er tilstrækkeligt vagt til, at alt og intet kan være civilisation. Det er en truisme uden kvalifikationer, uden empirisk indhold, uden falsifikationskriterier. Det er den bedsteborgerliges refræn, der kan anvendes i enhver kontekst, hvor skattekritikere og minimalstatstilhængeres argumentation ellers synes for overvældende.

Roger Scruton i den danske idedebat

RESUMÉ
Den britiske filosof Roger Scruton (1944 – ) fremhæves ofte som konservatismens mest indflydelsesrige nulevende filosof. Som forfatter til mere end 40 bøger, der behandler alt fra arkitektur og æstetik til seksualitet, græsk-romersk historie og britisk retspraksis kan Scruton lægge navn til  et vidtrækkende og komplekst livsværk, hvis facetter alle danner baggrund for hans politiske konservatisme. Scruton er imidlertid ingen doktrinær konservativ, men slår ofte til lyd for en forbrødring mellem konservative og klassisk liberale (mens han dog forsager de rene liberale, da de efter hans mening ikke har tilstrækkelig respekt for traditionelle værdier og den historiske proces).

Dette notat præsenterer en samling kortere essays fra borgerlige meningsdannere i Danmark, der hver skriver om Scruton på baggrund af deres personlige position i idedebatten herhjemme: Professor Nicolai J. Foss fra Copenhagen Business School vil nærme sig Scruton fra et klassisk liberalt perspektiv, der indeholder både liberale og konservative elementer. Teolog og formand for Trykkefrihedsselskabet Katrine Winkel Holm blev bedt om at vurdere Scrutons tænkning set med dansk-konservative øjne. Endelig tilfalder det antropolog og forfatter Dennis Nørmark at imødegå nogle af de Scruton’ske kritikker af den værdipolitiske liberalisme i sin rene form.

Samtlige skribenter finder tankegods hos Scruton, de er enige i, men også punkter, der mødes med reservationer og ægger til yderligere debat.

Scruton Notat Final

Paranoid Personality

The essential feature of the paranoid personality is a pattern of pervasive distrust and suspicion. People with a paranoid personality style often believe that others are behaving in a way that is dishonest or that others are out to get them. Paranoids are inclined to believe that other people intend to hurt or take advantage of them, even when there is no evidence to support their suspicions. They feel they cannot trust others and often believe that others are plotting against them, or might attack them out of the blue. They constantly question the motives of others and doubt the loyalty and trustworthiness of the people in their lives.

Confiding in others is difficult for them because they worry that the personal information they share will be used against them. Paranoids often interpret everyday conversations or comments as having negative or malicious intent and may view neutral comments as hostile or threatening. Some paranoids also hold grudges and have trouble “forgiving and forgetting.”

Paranoid personalities tend to have significant problems in their social relationships, as their suspiciousness may cause them to be argumentative and/or hostile towards well-meaning friends. Some people with the paranoid style behave in a very distant way where they avoid others because they are constantly questioning their motives and trustworthiness. In so doing, the paranoid may start a cycle of hostility that irritates others, and in this irritation, the paranoid sees the confirmation of their negative expectations of others. The paranoid’s suspicions can, in other words, turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

People with the paranoid personality often feel that they need to be self-sufficient and independent because of their problems interacting with others. They tend to be very controlling of their environment and may be seen as rigid or critical of others. Usually someone with a paranoid personality style will choose a job where they may work alone, decreasing their stress at having to interact with others.

Paranoid personalities are often litigious — that is, they take other people to court because they blame others for their own problems. They might view the world through a filter of stereotypes, assigning motives to groups of people based on physical, ethnic, or political associations. Finally, people with a paranoid style are often most comfortable with others who share their suspicious view of the world. For example, they may prefer friends who also believe that people are not to be trusted. Thus, many people with paranoid features in their personality join cults or neo-religious movements that keep them apart from the rest of society.

To a therapist, it is often difficult to determine whether someone has a paranoid style because their paranoid beliefs may sound real. People with the paranoid personality typically exhibit overblown perceptions. That is, their ideas may or may not be true; they may be overblown, but they are not completely free-roaming delusions. For example, delusions are often complicated and bizarre (for example, being abducted by aliens and taken aboard a spaceship), but overblown perceptions are not obviously false. In many cases they are simply notions that the paranoid continues to subscribe to in spite of evidence that they are incorrect (for example, that their cult leader really wants the best for them, even though they’ve discovered evidence of exploitation and wrongdoing). Finally, people with a paranoid style might occasionally experience brief psychotic episodes. They may lose touch with reality, as individuals with schizophrenia do, but it only occurs for a few minutes or hours. These episodes may occur when the person is under particular stress, such as having to interact with lots of people. As for co-morbidity, people with a paranoid style often experience depression, agoraphobia, obsessive-compulsive disorders, or alcohol and drug abuse.

Er Enhedslisten Danmarks Donald Trump?

I USA er de fleste iagttagere enige om, at hvis enhver anden kandidat havde opført sig, som Trump har gjort, så ville vedkommende være chanceløs nu. Ingen ville tage ham seriøst, og ingen ville stemme på ham. Forestil Dem f.eks. Rand Paul håne en invalid journalist for sit handicap. Eller Marco Rubio insinuere, at den aldrende John McCain ikke var ”rigtig” krigshelt, da han jo blev fanget af nordvietnameserne. Det var bare ikke gået.

I Danmark har vi tilsvarende en politisk kraft, som der gælder særlige regler for. Det er ikke Trump, men Enhedslisten.

Trump er gang på gang blevet anklaget for, at hans politik er indholdsløs og usammenhængende. Han er god til at tale vælgernes frustrationer op, men hans løsninger lader vente på sig. Ofte parerer han spørgsmål om, hvordan hans politik skal implementeres i praksis, med et ”trust me, it’s gonna be great.” Gerne gentaget en tre-fire gange med mindre variationer.

At det også forholder sig sådan med Enhedslisten, kan enhver forvisse sig om ved at se Pernille Skippers optræden i Vi ses hos Clement. Enhedslistens politiske ordfører kan ikke svare for, hvad der står i partiets eget principprogram, men forsøger sig i stedet med snak om andre anliggender.

Det er ikke en enlig svale. For tre år siden gik et klip med Skipper og Joachim B. Olsen viralt. Her griner Skipper overbærende, da Olsen påpeger, at Enhedslistens arbejdsmarkedspolitik er at give alle ret til mindst 15.000 kr. om måneden. Tallet er hentet fra Enhedslistens egen hjemmeside, men Skipper vil (igen) ikk forholde sig til det. Som Trump, der gang på gang benægter ting, han selv har sagt, nægtede Skipper simpelthen at diskutere substansen i egen politik. Hvorfor grinte hun egentlig? Mener hun ikke, at man skal tage Enhedslistens politik seriøst (noget kunne jo tyde på det)? Eller mener hun mon selv, at Enhedslistens politik er komisk?

Trump har en tendens til at hylde alternative statsformer og statsledere. For ham er det Putin og Rusland, den frie verden bør tage ved lære af. Med Enhedslisten er der vist ingen danske journalister, der rigtig kan finde ud af, hvad partiet egentlig mener om Sovjetunionen og Lenin. Men heldigvis ved vi, hvad de mener om Venezuela og Chavez. Det har Pelle Dragsted, Helle Brix m.fl. nemlig fortalt os igen og igen. Dog uden at ville forholde sig til den sult, inflation og fattigdom, der uvægerligt følger i hælene på den reelt eksisterende socialisme.

Hvad angår politisk uvidenhed, er Trump også i egen liga. Tænk f.eks. på den libertarianske præsidentkandidat Gary Johnson, hvis kampagne led et knæk, da han ikke ekstemporalt kunne forbinde Aleppo med konflikten i Syrien. Men forTrump gælder andre regler. Han har igen og igen afsløret, at han ikke kender til politiske fikspunkter som TTIP og Lockerbie, at han ikke har læst den amerikanske forfatning, at han ikke ved, at Det hvide hus ikke er Amerikas centralbank, og så videre. I Danmarks Radios Debatten fik Pernille Skipper tilsvarende her for leden afsløret, at Enhedslisten ikke ved, hvordan det er gået med skattetrykket her i landet over de sidste 30 år (Enhedslisten tror det er faldet, mens tal fra Skatteministeriet viser, det er steget). Højst imponerende lader Enhedslisten også til at have adgang til sine helt egen økonomiske sagkundskab, som mener, at topskattelettelser ikke medfører vækst.

Moral Foundations Theory, The theory in practice.

If you’ve been following the first two videos in this series, you now have a pretty good grasp of Moral Foundations Theory. But what does it all mean in practice? In this video, we are going to give a short example.

I recently saw the following exchange in my Facebook feed:

A libertarian, let’s call him LIBERTARIAN #1 said:

To all the workers out there: Happy Tax Freedom Day! If you pay the same amount of taxes as the average worker in this country, then today is the day that you are starting to earn money for yourself and not for the state. From January 1st until the present date, you have been working to finance the state. Congratulations!

To which a LEFT-WINGER replied:

Oh, that’s a lot of money which I could have used to line my own pockets. Or rather, which I could have used to pay for private insurance, private hospitals, private educational institutions, road pricing, security guards and so on, all of which I wouldn’t have a chance in hell of navigating sensibly in your libertarian dream society. And which I probably wouldn’t be able to afford with my (otherwise not too shabby) academic salary. So no thank you – go ahead and celebrate your tax freedom day, but in the meantime I’ll be celebrating that I get to live in one of the world’s richest and best-functioning countries, where we take care of our weak and disadvantages. I’ll happily pay my taxes, thank you.

At which point another libertarian, let’s call him LIBERTARIAN #2, replied:

It’s cool that you don’t feel like you’re capable of taking responsibility for your own life. But does that mean it’s OK to force others to live the way you want them to live?

The left-winger then replied:

I don’t wish to dictate to anyone how they should live their life. And you know what? I actually believe that this country is one of the countries in the world with the greatest opportunities for people to achieve their dreams and getting live the life they want. Regardless of which parents brought you into the world, whether they were rich or poor, you will have a chance in life because of the social programmes we have.

To which our friend LIBERTARIAN #2 replied:

You say that you wouldn’t be able to afford the services which are currently given as hand-outs to you by the state so therefore you are happy that they are financed through taxes. In other words, other people are forced to pay for things that benefit you. If that’s not dictating other people’s lives, then I don’t know what it is.

Predictably, this ended their exchange. So what happened here?

A metaphor that Haidt and others often use is that the six moral foundations are like the different taste receptors we have in the mouth – sweet, sour, salty, bitter, and so on.

In different videos, we explained how left-wingers have a care and fairness-based morality while libertarians have a liberty-based morality. So what happened here?

LIBERTARIAN #1 said: Today we celebrate liberty. Hooray for liberty!

The LEFT-WINGER then said: But what about care and fairness? How is it fair that someone should be poor just because their parents were poor?

Then LIBERTARIAN #2 comes into the thread and says: Enforcing care and fairness encroaches on liberty. That’s tyrannical.

The LEFT-WINGER then replies with an appeal to human well-being and care for the weak, that doesn’t answer the libertarian’s objection about it being an encroachment on liberty.

But on the other neither hand, nor does the libertarian address the left-winger’s concerns about fairness and care.  Both are just sticking to the moral foundations that are the most important to them.

So in reality, the exchange was more like this:

Liberty!

But what about fairness and care?

Liberty!

No, fairness and care!

No, liberty!

So if we return to the taste receptors metaphor, it’s like one guy only liking sweet things and another guy only like sour things.

“I like taxes. With them i buy civilization.”

“I like taxes. With them i buy civilization,” eller den historisk præcise variant “taxes are what we pay for civilized society,” er et af de dummeste svar man kan give på denne eller hin skattekritik. Ofte slynges citatet ud som en overraskende kobling, der skulle tage de skattekritiske røster på sengen. Antageligvis mener man, at folk, der synes skatten er for høj aldrig har tænkt over sammenhængen mellem skatter og samfund. Men selvfølgelig har skattekritiske tænkere skrevet essays og bøger om netop denne sammenhæng mange år før Oliver Wendell Holmes fandt på det pågældende bon mot. Bastiat f.eks.

Dernæst er der spørgsmålet om det, vi kunne kalde “civilisationens Laffer-kurve”: Får man mere civilisation af højere skatter? I så fald ville det mest civiliserede samfund have et skattetryk på 100%. Det er der måske visse fans af arbejdslejre, der mener, men næppe mange. Hvis vi er enige om, at det optimale skattetryk ikke er 100%, hvad er det så? Wendell Holmes udtalte sig på et tidspunkt hvor det samlede amerikanske skattetryk var 7.6%. I moderne kontekst nævnes af og til 20% som det mindst forvridende skattelejde. Det kunne man nok godt få de fleste skattekritikere med på. Men sjovt nok er det aldrig nogen af disse satser, der sigtes til ved den moderne brug af Wendell Holmes. Ofte er det noget mistænkeligt tæt på det nuværende skattetryk i ens hjemland.

Desuden er der spørgsmålet om _hvad_ der er civilisation. Det Kgl. Teater er civilisation, men er Kvinfo? At give hundredetusindevis af støttekroner til rabiate imam’er er anti-civilisation.