Indadvendt.dk

Af Mie Harder, ph.d.

(08.03.2011 – Oprindeligt bragt i Berlingske Tidene) Tirsdag er det Kvindernes Internationale Kampdag, men der er ikke meget at fejre. Igen i år skal vi høre på klynk fra universitetsuddannede karrierekvinder, der vil bruge statens magtapparat til at sikre sig poster i virksomhedsbestyrelser og ikke mindst på venstrefløjens nypuritanistiske og kvalmende politisk korrekte krav om et forbud mod købesex. Der er ikke brug for kvindekamp – men modkamp.

Kvindernes kampdag var oprindeligt et socialistisk initiativ lanceret af en forløber til Socialistisk Internationale i 1910. Efterfølgende er socialismens menneskefjendske idéer blevet forkastet, men alligevel fejrer vi stadig Kvindernes Kampdag.

Kvindekamp har rigtignok ikke været forbeholdt socialister, men i takt med opnåelsen af lighed for loven er de borgerlige kvindebevægelser blevet tavse. Med god grund. For fra et borgerligt perspektiv er kvindekampen for længst vundet.

Tilbage står den autoritære, socialistiske kvindebevægelse, der opfatter kvinder som et undertrykt kønsproletariat og kønsforskelle som en social konstruktion, der med vold og magt skal nedbrydes. Derfor er der en lige linje fra kvindekampen i dag tilbage til de socialistiske initiativtagere i 1910.

Feminisme handler nemlig ikke bare om bomuldstrusser, brændte BHer og hår under armene. Hvis det var tilfældet, kunne man nøjes med at trække på skuldrene, når feminister som Anne Grethe Bjarup Riis opfører deres surrealistiske teaterforestilling fra en svunden tid. Men de stopper ikke med dem selv. De vil også tvinge resten af samfundet til at indrette sig efter deres kønsneutrale utopier. Lige fordeling, lige opførsel og lighed, lighed, lighed. Indtil kvinder gror skæg og mænd producerer brystmælk.

Kvindekampen i dag er ikke bare forældet. Den er gået for vidt og kørt helt af sporet. Den oprindelige kamp for kvinders stemmeret, valgbarhed og lige rettigheder var berettiget og har haft uvurderlig betydning for kvinders position i samfundet siden hen. Men i starten og frem til midten af det 20. århundrede drejede kampen sig om lige rettigheder til mennesker og ikke særlige rettigheder til kvinder. Det drejede sig om lige muligheder i ordets egentlige forstand – dvs. lighed for loven – og ikke om lige resultater.

Men feministerne var ikke tilfredse, da de havde fjernet de formelle og lovgivningsmæssige barrierer for kvinderne. Den borgerlige kamp for lige rettigheder, som også tidligt blev båret frem af mænd som John Stuart Mill, havde opnået sit mål, men feministerne kæmpede videre. Nu er målet ikke lige rettigheder – men kvinderettigheder. Det er ikke længere nok med lige muligheder, vi skal også have lige resultater.

Desværre er denne feministiske præmis om lige resultater som ligestillingskampens forkromede mål blevet dominerende i ligestillingsdebatten. Selv ligestillingsminister Lykke Friis (V) arbejder i praksis for lige fordeling og ikke for lige rettigheder. Således kalder hun det et ligestillingsproblem, at mænd fylder mere end kvinder i bestyrelseslokalerne, fængslerne, blandt hjemløse og i universiteternes frafaldsstatistikker. Hun bruger den manglende resultatlighed som bevis for, at der må eksistere uformel diskrimination. For det er åbenbart helt utænkeligt, at mænd og kvinder kan have forskellige ønsker og prioriteter. Og det er helt bandlyst at mene, at biologiske forskelle på mænd og kvinder også har indflydelse på vores valg i livet. Næh nej. Den slags taler vi ikke om.

følge feministerne er kvinder først rigtigt frigjorte, når de opfører sig som mænd. Altså gør karriere og frigør sig fra »moderskabets fængsel«, som Erica Jong sidste år skrev i Wall Street Journal: »Nu om stunder er moderskabet blevet glamourøst, og i visse kredse er børn blevet et uundværligt statussymbol. Men vi skal ikke stikke os selv blår i øjnene: Børn som statussymboler kan være det ultimative fængsel for kvinder«.

Det er selvfølgeligt sympatisk, at ligestillingsministeren vil invitere mændene med ind i ligestillingsdebatten ved at omdanne Kvindernes Kampdag til »mænd og kvinders kampdag for lige muligheder«. Men hvis det alene drejede sig om lige muligheder, altså lighed for loven, ville kampdagen være overflødig. Ligesom Ligestillingsministeriet i sin natur er overflødigt. Men det kan en ligestillingsminister selvfølgelig ikke sige, og derfor må hun i stedet komme på skøre påfund som en kampdag for lige muligheder og et mandepanel for at give sit ministerium en eksistensberettigelse.

Den autoritære feminismes fremmarch er mest tydelig i vores nabolande Sverige og Norge. På mange skoler og fritidshjem må drenge ikke længere stå op og tisse. Virksomheder tvinges til at sammensætte deres bestyrelser på baggrund af køn frem for kvalifikationer. Og voksne mennesker må ikke indgå frivillige aftaler, hvis der udveksles sex for penge. »Alt er politik,« sagde feministerne i 1970erne. Deri har de desværre fået ret.

Meget af det samme er på vej i Danmark, hvis S og SF kommer til magten. Det ville dog klæde de velmenende kvindesagsforkæmpere at tænke lidt over, hvordan de i praksis vil gennemføre idealerne. Vil man give bøder, indtil virksomhederne makker ret eller lukker? Skal politiet med trukne stave eskortere kvinder ind i bestyrelseslokalerne? Skal ordensmagten ud og løfte dyner for at sikre sig, at ingen køber sig til kødelige fornøjelser? Er det dét samfund, vi ønsker?

Det eneste fornuftige svar er nej. At bruge statens voldsmonopol til at regulere antallet af kvinder og mænd i bestyrelser og til at blande sig i, hvem der dyrker sex med hvem og hvorfor, er både en krænkelse af den private ejendomsret og en ringeagt af den enkeltes ansvar for sit eget liv. Feminismens ønske om at kollektivisere den enkeltes lykke var forfejlet i 1910 og er stadig forfejlet i dag.

Der er ikke længere brug for kvindekamp. Hverken i den rendyrkede gammelfeministiske form eller iklædt moderne borgerlig retorik à la Lykke Friis eller de øvrige såkaldte »borgerlige feminister«. Disse borgerlige kvinder forsøger at bruge prædikatet »feminist« som en adgangsbillet til debatten om ligestilling. Og at dømme ud fra den eksponering, de har opnået, er det et godt spin. Men det ændrer ikke på, at det er både selvmodsigende og historieløst at kalde sig borgerlig feminist.

For hvad adskiller da disse borgerlige feminister fra andre borgerlige? I det store og hele intet. Udover at de er kvinder, selvfølgelig. Men var hele pointen ikke netop, at kønnet ikke er afgørende for politikken? At vi skulle være lige for loven? At kalde sig borgerlig feminist svarer til at kalde sig liberal marxist. Det er noget vrøvl. I stedet skulle vi bruge kræfterne på at bekæmpe feminismens langsomme nedbrydning af vores grundlæggende værdier: lighed for loven, ejendomsret og retten til at efterstræbe lykke. Også hvis lykken ikke resulterer i en snorlige fordeling af mænd og kvinder i alle samfundets afkroge.

Mænd og kvinder er (ofte) forskellige, de drømmer (ofte) om forskellige ting og har (ofte) forskellige mål i livet. Men det er i og for sig ligegyldigt. Hvis blot de stilles lige for loven, kan de opføre sig så forskelligt eller så ens, de ønsker.

Til gengæld kan vi ikke sidde på hænderne, når det kommer til den aggressive og autoritære feminisme, der i de seneste år har vundet frem i Danmark og i Europa. Der er ikke længere brug for kvindekamp – men modkamp. Kamp imod krav om særbehandling, tvang og undertrykkelse af mænd. Kamp imod snerpede og kværulerende feministers offergørelse og umyndiggørelse af kvinder. Kamp imod utopien om lige adfærd, lige fordeling og lige resultater.

by Theodor Ippolitovich Stcherbatsky

First conversation – Subject Monism

1-st Vedantin … Real at the beginning was the Nought.[1]

2-nd Vedantin … Real at the beginning was neither Existence nor the Nought.[2]

3-rd Vedantin … Real at the beginning was only Existence, the One-without-a-Second.[3] It was Brahman.

4-th Vedantin … The Brahman is identical with our own Self. The «This» art «Thou![4]»

Parmenides … There is no Nought.[5] The Universe is the One. It is immovable.

Democritus … Immovable is the Nought. It is Empty Space. It is filled by moving atoms.[6]

The Buddhist … There is an Empty Space. It contains an infinity of perishable Elements. There is a Nought (Nirvana), when all the perishable Elements have perished.

Nagarjuna … All perishable objects are relative and void. Their Nought, or the Great Void,[7] is the only reality. It is the Buddha (in his Cosmical Body).

Spinoza … There is only One Substance! It is God (in his Cosmical Body).

Dignaga … The Culmination of Wisdom is Monism[8]. This Unity is the Buddha (in his Spiritual Body).

Dharmaklrti … The essence of Consciousness is undivided![9] Subject and object is an illusive division. Their unity is Buddha’s Omniscience, his Spiritual Body!

Yogacara Buddhist … With the only exception of Buddha’s knowledge which is free from the division in subject and object, all other knowledge is illusive, since it is constructed as subject and object.[10]

Second conversation. Subject Dualism and Pluralism

Sankhya … There is not one eternal principle, but there are two: Spirit and Matter. Both are eternal, but the first is eternal stability, the other is eternal change. There is no interaction at all possible between them. However the change of the one is somehow reflected, or illumined, in the immovable light of the other. Inside Matter itself, six receptive faculties and six respective kinds of objective Matter are evolved. There is thus a double externality; the one is of the Matter regarding the Spirit. The other is of one kind of matter regarding the other. There is no God!

Descartes … All right! There are only two substances, the one extended, the other conscious. But both are eternally changing. There is a God, which is the originator and the controller of their concerted motion!

The Buddhist (Hinayana) … There is neither a God, nor an Ego, nor any spiritual, nor materialistic enduring substance. There are only Elements (dharmas), instantaneously flashing and disappearing. And there is a law of Dependent Origination in accord with which the Elements combine in aggregates. Just as in the Sankya there are six receptive faculties and six corresponding objective domains. There is thus here also a double externality. The one is of all Elements regarding one another, the other is of the six objective domains regarding the six receptive faculties.

Sankhya … These Elements are infra-atomic units (gunas), they are unconscious and eternally changing.

Heracleitus … These Elements are flashes appearing and disappearing in accord with a Law of continual change.

Democritus … These Elements are Atoms (material).

Herbart … These Elements are Reals (immaterial).

Mach … These Elements are nothing but sensations. Both the Ego and Matter are pure mythology. When philosophy is no more interested in the reality of an Ego, nothing remains but the causal laws of Functional Interdependence of sensations, in order to explain the connection of the whole.

J. St. Mill … The so-called Substance is nothing but a permanent possibility of sensations. “The notions of Matter and Mind, considered as substances, have been generated in us by the mere order of our sensations». Phenomena are held together not by a substance, but by an eternal law (of Dependent Origination).

Nagarjuna … Dependent Origination is alone without beginning, without an end and without change. It is the Absolute. It is Nirvana, the world sub specie aeternitatis.[11]

Third Conversation. Subject – the Logic of naive Realism and critical Logic

Dignaga … However the Universe sub specie aeternitatis can be cognized only by mystic intuition.[12] It cannot be established by logic!

Candrakirti … It can be established by the condemnation of logic![13] Since all logical concepts are relative and unreal, there must be another, non-relative, absolute reality, which is the Great Void. It is the Cosmical Body of the Buddha.

Dignaga … In logic «we are only giving a scientific description of what happens in common life in regard to the sources of our knowledge and their respective objects.[14] We do not consider their transcendental reality!» In logic we can admit the reality of the external world.

Candrakirti … What is the use of that logic,[15] if it does not lead to the cognition of the Absolute?

Dignaga … The Realists are bunglers in logic. They have given wrong definitions. We only correct them![16]

The Realist … The external world is cognized by us in its genuine reality. Just as the objects situated in the vicinity of a lamp are illuminated by it, just so are the objects of the external world illuminated by the pure light of consciousness. There are no images and no Introspection. Self-consciousness is inferential.[17]

The Yogacara Buddhist … There are images and there is introspection. «If we were not conscious of perceiving the patch of blue colour, never would we perceive it. The world would remain blind, it would perceive nothing». There are therefore no external objects at all. Why should we make the objective side of knowledge double?

Realist … But the running change[18] of our pepceptions can be produced only by the Force of Experience. They change in accord with the change in the external world![19]

Buddhist … You need to assume some sort of Biotic Force in order to explain the change. It will be either the Force of Experience,[20] or the Force of Productive Imagination,[21] or the Force of Illusion.[22] If you assume the latter there will be no reality at all in the phantom of an external world. If you assume the first there will be a superfluous double reality. If you assume the second you will have a transcendental ideality along with phenomenal reality.[23]

The Bealist … Your theory resembles «a purchase without paying!»[24] Indeed the external world, although consisting of mere point-instants, receives coloured perceptibility through imagination, but it can offer nothing in exchange, since it consists of colourless points! If sensation and understanding are entirely heterogeneous, how can a pure sensation be comprehended under a pure concept of the understanding, «as no one is likely to say that causality, for instance, could be seen through the senses?”[25]

Kant … There must be some third thing homogeneous on the one side with the category and on the other with the object as it is given in concrete.

Dharmakirti … The intermediate thing is a kind of intelligble sensation. We assume that after the first moment of pure sensation there is a moment of intelligible sensation by the inner sense which is the thing intermediate between pure sensation and the abstract concept.[26] There is moreover between them a Conformity or Coordination.[27]

The Realist … What is this Conformity or Coordination?

Vasubandhu … It is the fact owing to which cognition, although also caused by the senses, is said to cognize the object and not the senses.[28] The object is the predominant among the causes of cognition.

Dharmakirti … Coordination or Conformity is “Similarity between things absolutely dissimilar ».[29] Indeed all things as unities are things in themselves, absolutely dissimilar from other things. But in the measure in which we overlook their absolute dissimilarity (their «in themselves»), they become similar. They become similar through a common negation. That is why all images are Universals and all Universals are mutual negations. Negativity is the essence of our Understanding. The senses alone are affirmation.[30]

Hegel … According to my Dialectical Method, Negativity is equally the essence of the objective world, which is identical with the subjective one.

Dharmakirti … We must have an Affirmation contrasting with the Negativity of concepts.

Herbart … Pure sensation alone is Affirmation, it is absolute position!

Dignaga … Our logic aims at being equally acceptable to those who deny the existence of the external world and to those who maintain it. No one can deny that there are two kinds of cognized essences – the Particular and the Universal. The particular seemingly always resides in the external world, the universal is always in our head.

Berkley … There are no real universal or abstract ideas.

Dignaga … There are no particular ideas at all, an idea is always abstract and general. A particular image is a contradictio in adjecto. Particulars exist only in the external world. In our Mind apart from pure sensation, we have only universals.

Berkley … However to exist means to be perceived, esse est percepi. The external world does not exist beside what is perceived.

Dignaga … To exist means to be efficient.

Kant … It is “scandalous” that modern philosophy has not yet succeeded to prove beyond doubt the reality of the external world! If there were no things in themselves the phenomena as they appear to us would become such things. The things are «given» to our senses, they are “cognized”, i.e., constructed, by the Understanding in accord with its categories.

Santiraksita … Yes! Pure sensation is of course non-constructive, but it is a point-instant (Kraftpunkt) which stimulates the understanding to produce its own (general) image of the thing.

Dharmottara … Is it not a great miracle! The senses represent the Thing brightly, vividly, but they understand nothing definite. The intellect understands definitely, but without vividness, vaguely, dimly, generally; it can construct only a Universal. However the miracle is easily explained, The Understanding is Imagination!

Fourth Conversation. Subject – the Thing-in-Itself

F. H. Jacobi (and others) … Supposing the Things-in-Themselves really exist, they cannot affect our sensibility; since Causality, being a subjective Category, is possible only between phenomena,[31] not between things.

The Jaina … Yes indeed! A thing which is strictly in itself, which has absolutely nothing in common with all other things in the whole world, is a non-entity, a flower in the sky! If you wish to distinguish it from a non-entity you must admit «Thingness” as a real Category, just as Causality and Substantiality.[32]

Dharmottara … Thingness, Causality, Substantiality are of course general Categories of the Understanding. They are general and dialectical. But the single pure sensation is neither general, nor is it imagined, nor is it dialectical. There is a limit to generality, that out of which generality consists. Causality is not itself a sensible fact,[33] it is an interpretation of it. But the Thing-in-Itself is a cause, a reality, an efficient point-instant, a dynamical reality, a unity, a thing as it is strictly in itself, not as it is in the «other», or in the «opposite”. The terms ultimate particular, ultimate cause, ultimate reality, the real thing, the real unit, the thing in itself, the thing having neither extention nor duration are synonyms. But it does not follow that Causality, Reality, Thingness, Unity, etc., are not general terms, different categories under which the same thing can be brought according to the point of view. There is no other genuine direct reality than the instantaneous Thing-in-Itself. Its cognition alone is pure Affirmation, it is not dialectical, not negative, it is direct and positive. Thus the fact that Causality and Reality are concepts and Categories for the Understanding, does not in the least interfere with the fact that the Thing-in-Itself is the reality cognized in pure sensation.

Hegel … Your Thing-in-Itself is a phantom![34] It is Void.[35] It is an “absolute beyond» to all cognition.[36] Cognition becomes then contradictory, it becomes a cognition of a reality which is never cognized.[37]

Demokritus … [38] The Thing-in-Itself far from being a phantom is nothing but the material Atom, underlying the whole of phenomenal reality.

Epikurus … The Thing-in-Itself (arche) is the material Atom together with the Vacuum and Motion.

Lucretius … We must admit a principium or semen, and it is the material solid Atom.

Hegel … This principium is neither the Atom, nor an «absolute beyond», but it is included in the idea of cognition. It is true that the very idea of cognition requires the object as existing by itself, but since the concept of cognition cannot be realized without its object, therefore the object is not beyond cognition. “Inasmuch as cognition becomes sure of itself, it is also sure of the insignificance of its opposition to the object”.[39] Thus it is that the Thing-in-Itself as something beyond cognition, and opposed to it, disappears and the subject and object of cognition coalesce, according to the general rule that everything definite is not a thing «in itself”, but a thing «in its other» or «in its opposite!”

Dharmottara … It is true that the thing becomes definite only when it is a thing related to, or included in, the other. But when it becomes definite it pari passu becomes general and vague. Vivid and bright is only the concrete particular, the Thing as it is in itself.

Dharmakirti … First of all, it is not true that the Thing-in-Itself means cognition of something that never is cognized. And then it is also wrong that the relation of the object to its cognition is one of inclusion or identity. Indeed, if the Thing-in-Itself would mean something absolutely incognizable, we never would have had any inkling of its existence. It is not cognized by our Understanding, it is not -understood”, but it is cognized by the senses in a pure sensation. It is cognized brightly, vividly, immediately, directly. Its cognition is instantaneus.We call it «unutterable». But again it is not unutterable absolutely. We call it «the thing», the «in itself», the cause, the point-instant (svalaksana), efficiency, pure object, pure existence, reality, ultimate reality, pure affirmation, etc. etc. Understanding, on the other hand, means indirect cognition, judgment, inference, imagination, analysis, generality, vagueness, negativity, dialectic. Productive Imagination can imagine only the general and dialectical. But the senses cognize the real and the real is the particular.

Dharmottara … The relation of the object to the subject of cognition in logic is not Identity. The object is not included in the subject. It is wrong to reduce all relations to «otherness» and then to declare that the opposites are identical. The relation of cognition to its object is causal.[40] Object and cognition are two facts causally interrelated.

Fifth Conversation. Subject – Dialectic

Hegel … The relation between subject and object, between internal and external, seems at first to be causal, as between two realities.[41] But regarding them as an organic whole, there is no causal relation inside them at all.[42] There is nothing in the effect which did not preexist in the cause[43] and there is nothing real in the cause except its change into the effect.[44] But notwithstanding their identity cause and effect are contradictory. A change or a movement is possible only inasmuch as the thing includes a contradiction in itself.[45] Motion is the reality of contradiction.[46]

Kamalasila … We must distinguish between Causality and Contradiction. Causality is real, Contradiction is logical. Simple humanity, whose faculty of vision is obscured by the gloom of ignorance, indeed identifies causality with contradiction.[47] But philosophers must know the difference between contradiction and simple otherness, between otherness and necessary interdependence, between Causation and Coinherence, or Identity. They must know the theory of Relations of our Master Dharmakirti.

E. v. Hartmann (to Hegel) … Your Dialectical Method is simple madness![48]

Dharmakirti (to Hegel) … Your Dialectical Method is quite all right; but merely in the domain of the Understanding, i.e. of constructed concepts! Concepts are interrelated dialectically. Reality is interrelated by the causal laws of Dependent Origination. There is moreover an Ultimate Reality where subject and object coalesce. There is thus an imagined reality (parikalpita), an interdependent reality (paratantra) and an ultimate one (parinispanna).

Conclusion

In the course of our analysis we have quoted parallelisms and similarities, partial and complete, from a variety of systems and many thinkers of different times. But it would not be right to conclude that the Indian system is a patchwork of detached pieces which can be now and then found singly to remember some very well known ideas. The contrary is perhaps the truth.

There is perhaps no other system whose parts so perfectly fit into one compact general scheme, reducible to one single and very simple idea. This idea is that our knowledge has two heterogeneous sources, Sensibility and Understanding. Sensibility is a direct reflex of reality. The Understanding creates concepts which are but indirect reflexes of reality. Pure sensibility is only the very first moment of a fresh sensation, the moment x. In the measure in which this freshness fades away, the intellect begins to “understand”. Understanding is judgment. Judgment is x = A where x is sensibility and A is understanding. Inference, or syllogism, is an extended judgment, x = A+A1. The x is now the subject of the minor premise. It continues to represent sensibility. The A+A1 connection is the connection of the Reason with the Consequence. This reason is the Sufficient Reason or the Threefold Reason. It is divided in only two varieties, the reason of Identity and the reason of Causation. It establishes the consistency of the concepts created by the understanding and is expressed in the major premise. Their connection with sensible reality is expressed in the minor premise. In this part the doctrine is again nothing but the development of the fundamental idea that there are only two sources of knowledge. The doctrine of the dialectical character of the understanding is a further feature of the same fundamental idea, because there are only two sources, the non-dialectical and the dialectical, which are the same as the senses and the understanding.

The external world, the world of the Particulars, and the internal world, the world of the Universals, are again nothing but the two domains of the senses and of the understanding. The Particular is the Thing as it is in “itself”, the Universal is the Thing as it is in «the other».

And at last, ascending to the ultimate plane of every philosophy, we discover that the difference between Sensibility and Understanding is again dialectical. They are essentially the negation of each the other, they mutually sublate one another and become merged in a Final Monism.

Thus it is that one and the same Understanding must be characterized as a special faculty which manifests itself in:

1) the Judgment,
2) the Sufficient Reason,
3) the double principle of Inference, Identity and Causality,
4) the construction of the internal world of the Universals and
5) the dichotomy and mutual Negation contained in all concepts.

In all these five functions the Understanding is always the same. It is the contradictorily opposed part to pure sensation. Dignaga was right in putting at the head of his great work the aphorism: «There are only two sources of knowledge, the direct and the indirect.”

Dignaga’s system is indeed monolithic!

References

Conversation 1: 1. Chandogya, III.19.1; cp. Deussen, Allg. Gesch. d. Phil. I, pp. 145, 199, 202, and his Sechzig Upanishads, p. 155. 8 2. Rgv.10.129.1. 3. Chandogya, VI. 2, 1-2. 4. tat tvam asi. 5. ouk esti me einai. 6. Cp. H. Cohen, Logik d. r. Erk., p. 70; me on apparently = tadanya = = tadviruddha = paryadasa = parihara; ouk on = abhava. 7. maha-Sunyata = sarva-dharmanam paraspara-apeksata. 8. prajna-paramita jnanam advayam, sa Tathagatah (cp. my Introd. to the ed. of Abhisamayalamkara). 9. avibhago hi buddhyatma, an often quoted verse of Dharmakirti, cp. SDS., p. 32. 10. sarvam alambane bhrantam muktva Tathagata-jnanam, iti Yogacara-matena, cp.NBTTipp., p. 19. Conversation 2: 11. Cp. my Nirvana, pp. 48. Conversation 3: 12. yogi-pratyaksa, cp. ibid., p. 16 ff. 13. Ibid., p. 135 iff. 14. Ibid., p. MO ff. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Cp. vol. II, pp. 352 ff. 18. kadacitkatva. 19. Cp. vol. II, p. 369 and NE., p. 259. 11 20. anubhava-vasana. 21. vikalpa-vasana = vikalpasya samarthyam. 22. avidya-vasana = maya. 23. Cp. the detailed controversy between the Sautrantika Bealist and the Yogacara (Idealist) Buddhists in the II vol., p. 360 ff. 24. amulya-dana-kraya, cp. Tatp., p. 269. 9. 25. CPR., p. 113; an almost verbatim coincidence with NET,.p. 69. 11 = na nispanne karye kascij janya-janaka-bhavo nama drsto’sti. 26. Cp. the theory of manasa-pratyaksa, vol. II, Appendix III. 27. KK., p. 25S. 18 – tatsarupya-tadutpattibhyam visayatvam. 28. Cp. vol. II, p. 347. 29. atyanta-vilaksananam salaksanyam, cp. Tatp., p. 339. 30. pratyaksam = vidhi-svarupam. Conversation 4 31. F. H. Jacobi, Werke, II, p. 301 f. 32. TS, kar. 1713 – tasmat kha-puspa-tulyatvam icchatas tasya vastunah, vastutvam nama,samanyam estavyam, tat-samanata. 33. na kascid janya-janaka-bhavo nama drsto’sti. NBT., p. 69. 12. 34. «Gespenst», cp. W. der Logik, II, p. 441. 35. Ibid, p. 440, – «der formale Begriff… ist ein Subjectives gegen jene leere Dingheit-an-sich». 36. Ibid. – “ein absolutes Jenseits fur das Erkennen.” 37. Ibid. – “ein Erkennen dessen was ist, welches zugleich das Ding-an-sich nicht erkennts.” 38. “We take Demokritus as the pioneer of Materialism and the mechanical explanation of the universe. The opinion of W. Kinkel (History, v. I, p. 215) who converts him into a “consequent rationalistic Idealist”, is very strange. 39. Ibid., – “das Object ist daher zwar von der Idee des Erkennens als an sich seiend vorausgesetzt, aber wesentlich in dem Verhaltniss, dass sie ihrer selbst und der Nicbtigkeit dieses Gegensatzes gewiss, zu Realisierung ihres Begriffes in ihin komme». Conversation 5: 40. NBT., p. 40. 6-7 – “pramana-sattaya prameya-satta sidhyati… prameya-karyam hi pramanam; trsl., p. 108. 41. Phenomenology, p. 238 (on Causality between Mind and Body). 42 Ibid. p. 291. – “indem das Fursichsein als organische Lebendigkeit in beide auf gleiche Weise fallt, fallt in der That der Kausalzusammenhang zwischen ihnen hinwegs.” 43. Encycl. of philos. Sciences., p. 161. – «Es ist kein Inhalt in der Wirkung… der nicht in der Ursache ist; – jene Identitat ist der absolute Inhalt selbst.” 44. Ibid., p. 153, – “dieser ganze Wechsel ist das eigene Setzen der Ursache, and nur dies ihr Setzen ist ihr Sein.” 45. W. d. Logik, II. 68,- “nur insofern etwas den Widerspruch in sich hat bewegt es sich.” 46. Ibid., p. 59. – erdie Bewegung ist der daseiende Widerspruch selbstx. 47. Cp. above, p. 408 and 427. 48. “Eine krankhafte Geistesverirrung”, cp. E. v. Hartmann. Ueber die dialectiscbe Methode, p. 124.

From ‘If you Meet the Buddha on the Road, Kill Him’

by Sheldon B. Kopp

1. This is it.

2. There are no hidden meanings.

3. You can’t get there from here, and besides there is no place to go.

4. We are already dying, and we’ll be dead a long time.

5. Nothing lasts!

6. There is no way of getting all you want.

7. You can’t have anything unless you let go of it.

8. You only get to keep what you give away.

9. There is no particular reason why you lost out on some things.

10. The world is not necessarily just. Being good often does not pay off and there’s no compensation for misfortune.

11. You have the responsibility to do your best nonetheless.

12. It’s a random universe to which we bring meaning.

13. You really don’t control anything.

14. You can’t make anyone love you.

15. No one is any stronger or any weaker than anyone else.

16. Everyone is, in his own way, vulnerable.

17. There are no great men.

18. If you have a hero, look again; you have diminished yourself in some way.

19. Everyone lies, cheats, pretends. (yes, you too, and most certainly myself.)

20. All evil is potentially vitality in need of transformation.

21. All of you is worth something if you will only own it.

22. Progress is an illusion.

23. Evil can be displaced but never eradicated, as all solutions breed new problems.

24. Yet it is necessary to keep struggling toward solution.

25. Childhood is a nightmare.

26. But it is so very hard to be an on-your-own, take-care-of-yourself-cause-there-is-no-one-else-to-do-it-for-you
grown-up.

27. Each of us is ultimately alone.

28. The most important things each man must do for himself.

29. Love is not enough, but it sure helps.

30. We have only ourselves, and one another. That may not be much, but that’s all there is.

31. How strange, that so often, it all seems worth it.

32. We must live within the ambiguity of partial freedom, partial power, and partial knowledge.

33. All important decisions must be made on the basis of insufficient data.

34. Yet we are responsible for everything we do.

35. No excuses will be accepted.

36. You can run, but you can’t hide.

37. It is most important to run out of scapegoats.

38. We must learn the power of living with our helplessness.

39. The only victory lies is in surrender to oneself.

40. All of the significant battles are waged within the self.

41. You are free to do whatever you like. You need only face the consequences.

42. What do you know for sure…anyway?

43. Learn to forgive yourself, again and again and again and again.

af Ryan Smith

Psykologen Dan P. McAdams er ikke så kendt i Danmark, men hans integrative teori om personlighedspsykologiens tre niveauer er nyttig for at danne sig et større perspektiv på den måde, vi anskuer personligheden på. Ifølge McAdams kan personlighedspsykologi overordnet deles op i tre niveauer.

Niveau 1 – Trækteori

Niveau 1 består ifølge McAdams af træk. Såsom hvorvidt en person er indadvendt eller udadvendt, og hvorvidt vedkommende foretrækker at forholde sig tænkende eller følende, når der skal træffes beslutninger. Niveau 1 er med andre ord de træk, som man kan tillægge en person i (tilstræbt) videnskabelige personlighedsmatricer som The Big Five-systemet samt i Jungs typologi. Interessant nok, så anser McAdams ikke denne type information som særligt dybdegående; som han siger, så er det information, som trænede psykologer hurtigt opsnapper om andre mennesker, og ifølge McAdams er det denne type psykiske indsigter, vi falder tilbage på, når vi vil forklare ting om mennesker, som vi dybest set ikke kender godt nok til egentlig at vide noget om. McAdams er altså relativt kritisk over for trækteori og typologier, selvom han anerkender deres validitet.

Niveau 2 – Faktisk livshistorie

Niveau 2 omhandler derimod den afledte person, der opstår som en følge af de træk, vedkommende er født med, samt de betingelser, som vedkommende er født ind i. Hvad er personens mål i livet, og hvad er personens bevidste og ubevidste strategier for at opnå disse mål? En person, som er meget Følende i Jungs typologi kunne f.eks. være mere tilbøjelig til at opsøge en tilværelse som sygeplejerske eller psykolog, hvor vedkommende skal give mennesker omsorg, hvorimod en meget Tænkende type derimod kunne tænkes at blive advokat eller ingeniør, hvor de skal ”slå huller” i andre menneskers argumentation (advokat) eller måske overvejende undgå at have kontakt med andre mennesker (visse typer ingeniører). Men man kan ikke sige noget om, hvad en person har af mål i livet ud fra vedkommendes personlighedstræk alene. Man kan kun tale om større eller mindre sandsynligheder. For at blive klogere på en konkret persons mål i livet og måde at leve sit liv på, bliver man altså nødt til at bevæge sig væk fra Niveau 1 (trækteori) og videre til Niveau 2 (den specifikke persons livsforløb).

Som nævnt er McAdams kritisk over for trækteori (Niveau 1). Derfor mener McAdams, at vi som minimum bliver nødt til at bevæge os fra Niveau 1 og til Niveau 2, før vi kan sige, at vi kender en anden person. Trækteori (Niveau 1) er ifølge McAdams ikke andet end abstrakte karakteristikker. Først når det kombineres med et kendskab til personens unikke måde at udtrykke disse generelle træk på, kan vi ifølge McAdams tale om, at vi nu analyserer og kender en rigtig person af kød og blod.

Eksempelvis kunne en person, der udelukkende så mennesker gennem trækteori (Niveau 1) mene, at en person, der er meget Tænkende i Jungs typologi, var blevet advokat, fordi det ligger til Tænkende mennesker at blive advokater (undersøgelser viser, at langt de fleste advokater har en præference for Tænkning over Følen i Jungs typologi). Men hvis vi sagde, at denne person kun var blevet advokat, fordi han var Tænkende, så ville vi ifølge McAdams gå glip af de specifikke omstændigheder, der har gjort, at vedkommende oprindeligt blev advokat: Det er ikke nok at have Tænkende træk for at blive advokat; der må også være konkrete omstændigheder, der giver vedkommende adgang til at læse jura osv. Og her er McAdams’ pointe så, at vi udelukker os selv fra at opleve disse nuancer, hvis vi insisterer på kun at se personen igennem trækteori (Niveau 1).

Således kunne man sige, at Niveau 1 groft sagt består af en persons medfødte, eller tidligt formede træk, mens en persons Niveau 2 repræsenterer det liv, personen har levet op til nu, og den unikke måde, som vedkommende har udtrykt sine træk på op til nu. Niveau 1 er altså groft sagt arv (nature), mens Niveau 2 groft sagt er miljø (nurture). Men som vi nævnte i starten af denne artikel, så består McAdams model af tre niveauer. Så hvad mangler der? Jo, det tredje niveau – identitet.

Niveau 3 – Identitet og narrativ

Niveau 3 omhandler ifølge McAdams en persons selvforståelse, vedkommendes personlige fortælling om sin livshistorie op til nu. Niveau 2 er det konkrete liv, som personen har levet, og Niveau 3 er den historie, som vedkommende har fortalt sig selv om sit liv op til nu. Forskellen på Niveau 2 og Niveau 3 kunne f.eks. være følgende: Lad os sige, at en person har forsøgt selvmord to gange i sit liv. Personen har måske undertrykt og fortrængt det ene forsøg, og har derfor selv en livshistorie, som indeholder et enkelt selvmordsforsøg. Men måske har personen stadig arrene på armen efter det ene selvmordsforsøg, som vedkommende altså har ”glemt” igen ved at fortrænge det. Det er præcis forskellen på Niveau 2 og Niveau 3: Niveau 2 er virkeligheden, som den ville se ud, hvis terapeuten havde et fuldstændigt indblik i patientens livshistorie. Niveau 3 er personens livshistorie, som så kan divergere mere eller mindre fra det faktiske liv (Niveau 2), men også fra vedkommendes træk (Niveau 1). En person, der er født meget indadvendt, men ser sig selv som udadvendt, er f.eks. en person, hvor vedkommendes Træk (Niveau 1) er i konflikt med vedkommendes Narrativ om sig selv (Niveau 3). Niveau 3 er altså den virkelighed, som man socialt har konstrueret for sig selv og for andre. Det er det mest overfladiske niveau, idet man kan fortælle en anden historie om sig selv end den faktiske; eksempelvis siger mange alkoholikere til sig selv, at de vitterligt ikke har noget problem med alkohol, og mange af dem tror selv på det. Men samtidig med, at Niveau 3 er det mest overfladiske niveau, så er det også det mest intense og emergente, fordi vores kommunikation med den anden altid må gå gennem personens selvforståelse (Niveau 3).

Vi kan nu vise McAdams’ model i kortform:

McAdams-niveau	Indhold	McAdams’ mening om denne type indsigt i andre
Niveau 1 – Trækteori	Medfødte træk, præferencer på The Big Five, Jung-Type	Personkendskab, hvor personen kun forstås gennem abstraktioner; kendskab som var personen ”en fremmed”
Niveau 2 - Livsforløb og psyke	Konkret livsforløb, formative hændelser, personens mål, forsvarsmekanismer og unikke mannerismer	Umiddelbart personkendskab; mere direkte end Niveau 1, men ikke så dybt som Niveau 3
Niveau 3 - Narrativitet	Personens historie om sig selv	Personkendskab, hvor man kender personen intimt

Og her er så det skarpsindige ved McAdams’ personlighedsteori: Psykisk velvære er, ifølge McAdams, når alle tre niveauer passer sammen. Har vi f.eks. en person, som (fra naturens hånd?) er født meget indadvendt, men hvis opvækst har fundet sted i et miljø, der har påtvunget udadvendt adfærd, så passer McAdams’ Niveau 1 og 2 f.eks. ikke sammen. Der er et mismatch, som skaber følelsesmæssig ustabilitet (neuroticisme) i personen. Ligeledes, hvis personen ikke anerkender, at vedkommende har skullet “svømme mod strømmen” i sin opvækst, men fortæller sig selv, at “det da ikke var så slemt”, så passer niveau 1, 2 og 3 ikke sammen. I så tilfælde vil personen  sandsynligvis have uerkendt frustration over sin opvækst, som får vedkommende til at reagere adverst i voksenlivet.

Således kan man komme på mange og varierede eksempler på, hvordan en konflikt mellem nogen af disse tre niveauer fører til uligevægtig adfærd og følelsesmæssig ustabilitet. Opskriften på psykisk sundhed er derfor: (1) Lær dine egne karakteristika at kende mht. trækteori; tag f.eks. en Jung-test, find ud af nogenlunde hvor du ligger i forhold til gennemsnittet, hvad angår personlighedstræk, opvækst, socialklasse, m.v. (2) Få afdækket evt. “løgnehistorier”, som du selv, eller din familie, kan have fortalt dig om din opvækst (f.eks. fortæller mange familier hinanden, at de er “finere” end de er, at de engang var adelige m.v.) (3) Tag et grundigt blik på dig selv og vurdér, om din nuværende livshistorie og dit nuværende selvbillede virkelig står i mål med realiteterne. På kort sigt, f.eks. til jobsamtaler eller på byture, er det måske en god idé at lyve sig bedre, end man er, men på længere sigt vil folk, der er udstyret med bare et normalt rummål af empati, kunne fornemme det, hvis man lyver for meget for sig selv, eller hvis man projicerer et selvbillede ud i omgivelserne, som ikke står i mål med virkeligheden.

Vurdering

Som det fremgår af det ovenstående, er McAdams dybest set kritisk over for trækteori, mens hans egentlige kærlighed er narrativiteten. McAdams er bedst, når han integrerer forskellige tilgange til psykologien til et større hele, og værst, når han prøver at gøre narrativitet til noget mere ”ægte” end trækteori: Selv har jeg det nemlig modsat af McAdams, og på den måde er det måske lidt ironisk, at jeg har gidet skrive om ham. McAdams mener, at vi kun virkelig kan kende en person, når vi kender vedkommende på vedkommendes egne præmisser. Jeg mener, at trækteori er det mest sigende af McAdams’ tre niveauer, og som god trækteoretiker mener jeg endvidere, at ens præference for henholdsvis trækteori eller narrativitet i sig selv kan være afledt af, hvilke træk der præger ens kognition. – Hvis jeg da ikke er enig med Buddha i, at en person dybest set ikke har noget selv, og at selvet derfor er en illusion.

I 1945 fik en allieret psykolog ved navn G.M. Gilbert lov at undersøge de tilfangetagne nazi-ledere. Han udsatte dem bl.a. for den tyske version af Wechsler-Bellevue-IQ-testen, og resultaterne var som følger:

1	Hjalmar Schacht	143
2	Arthur Seyss-Inquart	141
3	Hermann Goering	138
4	Karl Doenitz	138
5	Franz von Papen	134
6	Eric Raeder	134
7	Dr. Hans Frank	130
8	Hans Fritsche	130
9	Baldur von Schirach	130
10	Joachim von Ribbentrop	129
11	Wilhelm Keitel	129
12	Albert Speer	128
13	Alfred Jodl	127
14	Alfred Rosenberg	127
15	Constantin von Neurath	125
16	Walther Funk	124
17	Wilhelm Frick	124
18	Rudolf Hess	120
19	Fritz Sauckel	118
20	Ernst Kaltenbrunner	113
21	Julius Streicher	106

Nazisternes reaktioner:

Papen: Irritabel, men dog tilfreds, da det senere viste sig, at han havde opnået en høj IQ score.

Goering, Speer, Hess, Rosenberg, Ribbentrop, Saukel, Fritzche: Syntes det var morsomt at tage testen, forholdt sig åbne og imødekommende.

Goering: Som nævnt entusiastisk omkring testen, men skiftede til skeptisk, da han senere fandt ud af, at han ikke var den iblandt de tilfangetagne nazister, som havde højest IQ.

Schacht (som scorede højest): Skeptisk over for selve ideen bag IQ-tests. Syntes, psykologer og psykiatere bedrev et “trist erhverv”.

Keitel: Fascineret af testens objektivitet og entusiastisk omkring, hvor meget bedre den var end det “nonsens”, som der Wehrmacht brugte i sine tests. Samtidig ved man dog, at Keitel selv havde forhindret brugen af intelligenstests i nazityskland, da hans søn havde dumpet en sådan test.

Yderligere informationer:

• I 1945 ville IQ 130 og derover kvalificere til Mensa.
• Havde de af nazisterne, hvis IQ var 130 eller derover, scoret således på de IQ-test, der administreredes i visse amerikanske grundskoler på det tidspunkt, så var deres forældre blevet tilbudt at få sat deres børn i eliteskoler.
• Nazisterne var generelt imod IQ-tests, da de fostrede individualitetsfølelse, og da jøder ofte klarede sig bedre end etniske tyskere på dem.

Kilder:

Mosley, Leonard: The Reich Marshal: A Biography of Hermann Goering – Forlag: Dell (1975)

Miale & Belzer: The Nuremberg Mind: The Psychology of the Nazi Leaders – Forlag: The New York Times Book Co. (1975)

continued from part 1 of this essay, also published on this site.

by Majken Hirche

It has repeatedly been observed that the literary value of Mary Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein’ mainly relies on a fortunate convergence of romantic and pre-romantic archetypes creating a powerful mythology of the self.[1] Claiming to be a tale about the modern Prometheus, Mary Shelley successfully blends Greek mythology as inspired by Ovid’s Metamorphoses (especially, it seems, book three on Narcissus and Echo) with other works such as Milton’s Paradise Lost, Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Goethe’s Werther and Byron’s Manfred.[2] But the truly innovative aspect in Mary Shelley’s novel might lie somewhere else. Her description of Victor Frankenstein’s mental world and behaviour match the definition of a pathological narcissist to such a degree that it makes it quite improbable for her to have based the novel solely on well-developed religious and literary tropes. In other words, Shelley must have had real life experience with narcissism which she subsequently used as template for Victor Frankenstein.

According to Christopher Small, Victor Frankenstein is an intentional portrayal of her husband Percy Shelley: “Frankenstein’s first name is Victor, the same [...] that Percy Shelley took for himself on a number of occasions in boyhood and later.”[3] Eustace Chesser has a similar hunch, suggesting that “Shelley was narcissistic, to such a degree that it was a barrier to the formation of other relationships.”[4]

However, according to Philip Ball[5] it is much more likely that Victor Frankenstein is a portrayal of Mary Shelley’s father, William Godwin, to whom the book was dedicated. Just like Frankenstein disowns his creature, Godwin abandoned Mary when she decided to get romantically involved with the married Percy Shelley who himself more likely was represented by Frankenstein’s faithful friend Henry Clerval.[6] This psychological constellation could explain why Frankenstein is described in such ambivalent ways, and why Mary Shelley never really condemns her two protagonists. It might also explain why the creature is described with such warm feelings, even though Frankenstein is the official narrator of the novel. Mary Shelley cannot but identify herself with the creature.

Whatever the case may be, understanding Victor Frankenstein as a narcissist might help to pinpoint the reason for the novel’s immediate popular success and its long term influence on many genres of literature, such as Gothic novels and science fiction.[7] In general, the romantic era was characterized by negative attitudes towards scientific rationalization of nature, and in contrast had positive attitudes towards emotions of authenticity, purity, awe, the sublime and similar introverted experiences boosting the feeling of the self.[8] Modern parents, when raising a child with such inclinations, would probably send it to a school psychologist who would diagnose it as a mild narcissist with escapist tendencies.

The cultural influences of ‘Frankenstein’ have been immense. Since 1982, 130 works of fiction based on ‘Frankenstein’ have been made, fifty fiction series, more than forty adaptations in film and more than eighty stage productions.[9] No wonder then, that the ideas derived from Victor Frankenstein and his creature have grown into a huge basket of adapted, distorted and sophisticated mythologisations. Although literary critic Chris Baldick has stated that “the truth of a myth is not to be established by authorising its earliest versions, but by considering all its variations.”[10] Enumerating them all would be a daunting task.[11]

What is of main interest from the perspective of a psychological analysis of Victor Frankenstein are the following two myths: 1) Mary Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein’ constitutes the first prototype to the idea of the ‘Mad Scientist’, and 2) If the creator has a sick or corrupt character, his (and it is always a man) artificial creations will symbolise an act of hubris and become fatal.[12]

Today, the Mad Scientist is a well-known stereotype. With wild eyes, bristling white hair and always carrying a white lab coat, he is the quintessential lunatic with a brain of a genius. Often he is playing God, sometimes evil, but more likely just an unintentional villain. Examples in literature and films are legion, but some of the most popular ones are Lex Luthor, Dr. Strangelove, Doctor Who, Doctor X, Dr. Clayton Forrester, Dr. Frank-N-Furter, Captain Nemo, Dr. Jekyll, Dr. Moreau, Hari Seldon and all villains in the James Bond movies. Also real life examples like Nikola Tesla and Josef Mengele have contributed to the myth of the Mad Scientist.

The problem with the Mad Scientist is that he not only is a megalomaniac trying ‘to play God’, his greater sin is his sick or corrupt character. This leads to the second important stereotype pervading the mythological ‘science of anthropoeia’: The Mad Scientist unconsciously knows that his motivation for creating an artificial being is a vane desire to create a grandiose version of himself. This is a sin. It erodes behavioural norms, and is the reason why he tends to hide his work behind a wall of stealth and secrecy.

The hubris of self-creation has become a virulent meme in the literature since ‘Frankenstein’. When motivated by vanity or pride, all scientific and artistic creations will become dangerous and fatal. Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray exemplifies this trope from an artist’s point of view. Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is an example from the perspective of a scientist. Jekyll confesses that “Had I approached my discoveries in a more noble spirit, […] all must have been otherwise, and from these agonies of death and birth I had come forth an angel instead of a fiend.”[13] Also Dr. Moreau in H. G. Wells’ novel The Island of Doctor Moreau hides away his ‘House of Pain’ where he creates terrifying dehumanised creatures called the ‘Beat People’[14]. While the original culprit of the myth of the Mad Scientist, Victor Frankenstein, never shows any sign of remorse, he still has the wish to hide away: “I shunned my fellow-creatures as if I had been guilty of a crime.”[15], he says, because deep down in his conscience he knows that he is doing something very unacceptable. Nowadays this stereotype of the mad scientist and his hidden narcissistic weaknesses represents the most persistent and annoying myth about science, but also a most funny one, at least in the spheres of fiction where many additional stories are bound to be told.

by Majken Hirche

One of the most conspicuous features of Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel ‘Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus‘ is a strikingly accurate portrait of a pathological narcissist as expressed by the novel’s protagonist, the science student Victor Frankenstein. Apart from Victor Frankenstein only one other character appears as fully developed: An unnamed creature, born out of Victor Frankenstein’s grandiose fantasies, scientific skills and pursuit of divine power. All other characters appear as mere scenery on a stage where dichotomies of human nature contrast each other, and where the underlying question of whether or not the two main characters are shadow images of each other is ever present. By focusing on Victor Frankenstein and the creature, Mary Shelley succeeded in creating a novel that mirrors a personal story as well as many of the intellectual and aesthetic themes of the romantic era. It is obvious that Victor Frankenstein suffers from a mental disorder in the shape of pathological narcissism. Therefore, focusing on the disorder might be a useful prism for the understanding of the novel and its subsequent influence on popular culture. In this articleI will (1) find examples in the novel where Victor Frankenstein shows clear signs of having a mental disorder according to Millon and DSM-IV,[1] (2) discuss to what degree Victor Frankenstein perceives the creature as an echo of himself, which not only reflects his mental disorder, but also a fear of the unnatural, (3) discuss the likelihood that Mary Shelley had a personal experience with a narcissist, and thus had a more profound knowledge of narcissism than what she could have derived from the literature, and (4) suggest that Mary Shelley has contributed greatly to the myth of the ‘Mad Scientist’, and to the myth that anthropoeia[2] will never succeed when its maker has a weak and corrupt character such as a vain desire to create a grandiose double of himself.

Born in the romantic era by highly educated and politically influential parents, Mary Shelley (1797–1851) had a first hand knowledge of the intellectual and aesthetic currents of her time when she wrote ‘Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus’. Her father, William Godwin (1756–1836), was one of the first exponents of English utilitarianism, and active in the earliest anarchist movements. Her mother, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797), had been a philosopher and an eager advocate of women’s rights.[3]

At the age of 17, Mary Godwin began a romantic relationship with Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), a poet and political follower of William Godwin. Unfortunately, Percy was already married, and the resulting scandal and renouncement of the young couple by their families made them leave England and travel through Europe for some months.[4]

In 1816, the ‘year without a summer’, Mary and Percy spend the dark and rainy days in Switzerland, with, among others, Percy’s friend Lord Byron[5] (1788–1824) who was a leading figure of the romantic movement. The company agreed to write stories of the supernatural,[6] and after two weeks of thinking, talking and dreaming about horrific things, Mary Shelley came up with preliminary ideas that subsequently led to ‘Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus’. The novel was published in 1818 anonymously, and later re-published in 1823 under her name.[7]

Despite the notion of Mary Shelley being inspired by a romantic archetype of the Shadow or the Prometheus,[8] Mary painted an astonishingly accurate picture of a pathological narcissist in Victor Frankenstein. Surprisingly few literary critics have pointed out this pervasive personality trait in the novel’s protagonist,[9] which might, at least in part, be due to the fact that narcissism and its corresponding pathological description was developed some hundred years later by Sigmund Freud.[10]

In the light of modern psychiatry[11]+[i] ‘Frankenstein’ is a sad tragedy portraying a narcissist at full blast, a total disaster destroying his own being and the people around him in an obsessive and delirious pursuit of divine power. Indeed, ‘Frankenstein’ is richly furnished with descriptions of incidents that expose Victor Frankenstein’s mental condition.

Right from the beginning of Frankenstein’s narrative we are witnessing the grandiose and unrealistic sense of superiority in a man who expects complete submissiveness from his peers and his family. In his earliest childhood recollection Frankenstein’s sense of self importance and special status was already present: “I was their plaything and their idol,” and “the innocent and helpless creature bestowed on them by Heaven, whom to bring up to good.” [12] His wife-to-be Elizabeth is also introduced, her nature and qualities being described as no less than divine in order to complement Frankenstein’s ego: “The moulding of her face so expressive [...] that none could behold her without looking on her as of a distinct species, a being heaven-sent, and bearing a celestial stamp in all her features.”[13] However, Elizabeth is never really allowed to be his equal as there can be only one superior, and thus he subjects her by telling that “till death she was to be [his] only.”[14]  Apart from his family Frankenstein has only one friend, the “tender” and “noble spirited” Henry Clerval,[15] as Frankenstein believes himself to be “totally unfitted for the company of strangers.”[16] Frankenstein shields himself from painful experiences of unexpected criticism by surrounding himself with unquestioning, gentle and loving people, the “old familiar faces,” who nourish his grandiose ego.

Later in life Frankenstein attends university. During his studies he is drawn to old-fashioned alchemy and natural philosophy, with a special interest in physiology and the structure of the human frame.[17] These particular studies ignite Frankenstein’s smouldering zest for godlike power, as he one day imagines himself creating life from lifeless matter; indeed, “what had been the study and desire of the wisest men since the creation of the world was now within my grasp.”[18] From here on Frankenstein endlessly pursues his goal for years ”with unrelaxed and breathless eagerness”,[19] disregarding his caring and concerning family in the meantime even though he knows that his year long silence disquiets them.[20] Frankenstein’s grandiose delirium and disturbed nature becomes more and more pronounced as he closes in on his goal:”No one can conceive the variety of feelings which bore me onwards, like a hurricane, in the first enthusiasm of success. […] A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their beings to me”[21], and thus he creates a living being, unfortunately however, in the shape of a very ugly creature.[22]

The narcissist’s ultimate nightmare is to have his fallibilities revealed, because this will disrupt his self-image and protection against his painful unconscious.[23] It is of no surprise then, that we see Victor Frankenstein’s narcissism most starkly exposed shortly after he has succeeded in creating a being that turns out to be imperfect. He runs away abandoning any responsibility,[24] and starts vehemently to suppress its existence.[25] Instead of behaving like a truly responsible scientist with an inquiring mind and a calm methodology, Frankenstein does exactly the opposite: He reacts like a spoiled child scared of a toy he was just perfectly happy to play with, and becomes sick and depressed like a hysterical patient who needs to be taken care of by Henry Clerval.[26]

Seen from a narcissist’s perspective, this reaction is understandable: Frankenstein is confronted with a far from perfect version of himself. Faced with his ugly shadow, a disfigured echo yelling distorted grunts to the hidden depths of his narcissistic psyche, he unfolds the typical defence mechanisms of a narcissist ego in danger. He becomes a denialist, desperately rationalizing his responsibilities away,[27] and allows death and disaster to poison his family and friend in the shape of an abandoned creature who is doomed to live in eternal loneliness and isolation.[28]

Things could have been different, though. Like all true romantic novels, an innocent and unspoiled being is not cruel in its natural state. As the creature starts to tell its own story about how it learns the ways of life the reader realises that it is like a ‘noble savage’;[29] innocent, good and free from the corrupting influence of civilization, having no other desires than to love and be loved.[30] Only when faced with its fate the creature turns vindictive and wicked. As Percy Shelley notes in his introduction to Mary Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein’; “the destructive consequences of withheld love can only be revenge and wickedness.”[31]

At work is a dyadic transfer: Victor Frankenstein calls the inanimate body “beautiful” up until the point where it opens its eyes and looks “wicked”.[32] But the creature is beautiful on the inside, only carrying a bit of bad craftsmanship on the outer shell. Frankenstein’s inability to comprehend this suggests that the creature might be more human than its creator. In fact, all that was admirable and noble in Frankenstein can be seen as transferred to the creature.

Of course the creature is misunderstood by the outside world. The centuries old fear about the treacherous, Faustian nature of anthropoeia[33] – of the creation of artificial people – is the true cause of the unravelling tragedy, and not the creature as such. Among scholars this is called a naturalistic fallacy; an erroneous belief in the equivalence of the unnatural and evil, the artificial and imperfect, the ugly and wicked.[34]

Only through the reflecting lens of education and civil norms the creature eventually learns to see itself the same way as others do: “Increase of knowledge only discovered to me more clearly what a wretched outcast I was. I cherished hope, it is true, but it vanished when I beheld my person reflected in water or my shadow in the moonshine, even as that frail image and that inconstant shade.” Now the creature only dares to look at itself in the moonshine at night, ashamed of being unnatural and ugly. It has annexed the prevailing beauty ideal by hating its ugliness. It has become naturalized to the fear of the unnatural.

End of part  of this essay. Part 2 also avaliable on this site.

Notes:

by Majken Hirche

Humans write, for the most part, to communicate with other humans, and this, of course, also goes for essay writing. It would therefore be productive to consider some aspects of human nature and written communication in relation to what humans perceive as good writing. Humans are curious , and when they read, they like to be presented with something new . Thus, good writing first of all offers new ideas, or at least new ways of looking at older ideas, to teach and please the curious mind. In addition, humans find simplicity difficult to resist: According to social psychologists, the human mind simply loves what is easy and dislikes what is difficult . It is therefore equally important to present the new ideas in a way that is appealing to the mind. Otherwise, what is the point of writing down new and exciting ideas, if no one bothers to read about them in the first place?

Humans are by nature highly curious species, and they grasp every opportunity to explore, investigate and learn something new whenever they can, simply because it gives them a sense of pleasure and reward . It is of no surprise then, that new ideas are likely to invoke a certain amount of interest in humans. Therefore, think of the idea as a vital fundament of writing, and the first element to develop before getting into the actual writing process.

New and exciting ideas do not come by themselves however. It takes time and effort, and lot of mental energy to create new ways of looking at things. Fortunately, a smart guy named Alex Osborn got a brilliant idea one day in 1939 , and created a tool to aid and trigger new ways of thinking: Alex gave us brainstorming. Brainstorming is basically a four step program with the following rules : 1) focus on quantity, and generate as many thoughts and ideas as possible in relation to a chosen subject; 2) withhold criticism, and focus on being open to everything that comes into mind, no matter how odd the ideas may seem; 3) generate unusual ideas by looking at the subject from new perspectives by suspending assumptions; 4) try to improve ideas by combining existing ideas to form a single and better idea.

The brainstorming should result in a list of (hopefully) good ideas, from which the best idea can be picked out, and once the really good idea is found, it is time to consider some other significant elements of good writing.

Simplicity delights the human mind, and it is therefore important to create a text that is easy to read. However, complex writing is often quick and easy, while simplicity takes time, but never the less, less is more, and it is important not to overcomplicate things. Thus, by exchanging foreign words or scientific terms for simpler words, and by keeping the sentences short, the good writer has already done half the work. The text also has to make sense though. Therefore, address the topic and say what is relevant, and say it in a well ordered and logic manner; this will prevent the human mind from thinking too hard, and will in turn release pleasing chemicals in the brain, thereby making the human mind feel good about what it reads . On the contrary, if the human mind has to spend too much energy on sorting things out, it becomes tired and will likely give up reading half way through, and think of the experience as bad. One last thing, also make sure that the grammar is in order, and that the text has been thoroughly worked over many times – as the clever people say; good writing is rewriting.

References

Greetham, B. (2001). Palgrave Study Guides: How to Write Better Essays. Palgrave Macmillan.

Kang, M. J., et al. (2009). The Wick in the Candle of Learning: Epistemic Curiosity activates Reward Circuitry and Enhances Memory. Psychological Science, 20(8): 963-73.

Willis, J. (2008). Teaching the Brain to Read: Strategies for Improving Fluency, Vocabulary, and Comprehension, ASCD.

Winkielman, P. & Cacioppo, J. T., 2001. Mind at Ease Puts a Smile on the Face: Psychophysiological Evidence That Processing Facilitation Elicits Positive Affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(6): 989-1000.