Category Archives: Bøger

Review of: Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy By: Vishwa Adluri

THE GOOD

– Author has read all the major authors on Parmenides
– Author has good critical thinking skills and is critical of the previous authors
– Author has read big names like Derrida and Heidegger, recaps their thinking, disagrees and provides good arguments
– Book is clearly written (in a clear and simple style)
– Author interprets Parmenides as an ontologist/existentialist, rather than the “super-logician” that so many others have wanted to make him (e.g. Daniel W. Graham)
– Book includes a technical translation of Parmenides with philological notes at the back

parmenides THE BAD

– Author’s interpretation of Parmenides is original, but questionable
(His Thesis: The youth is shown how the logic of the goddess, being general and impersonal, affords only an immortal view of the universe. But humans are mortals and must die. Therefore the doxa is the youth’s attempt to reassert his dignity and individuality as a mortal being, whose nature is specific, individualist, and limited in time. This makes Parmenides into a proto-Sartre and this reading is HIGHLY questionable, relying on multiple sleights of hand to even begin to bear the semblance of truth.)
– Author relies, in places, on a very close reading of the poem, yet as detailed in Parmenides Venerable and Awesome, this is a foolhardy endevour: The original papyrus has been lost, the poem was copied again and again and that was under the very poor standards of scholarship that existed in antiquity. Relying on specific words and sentence structures to extract meaning from Parmenides is therefore a bad idea. One should instead rely on the overall picture of the genuine fragments.

THE UGLY

– After having set forth his thesis of Parmenides’ poem, as described above, the author then launches into an exposition of Plato’s dialogues. Here the author posits that Plato (more or less knowingly) reiterated the same themes in his Socratic dialogues that Parmenides did in his own poem some 80 years earlier. We know that Plato was acquainted with Parmenides’ philosophy, but to say that Plato’s purpose in writing his dialogues was but to re-hash this HIGHLY speculative and unlikely reading of Parmenides crosses the boundary between making reasonable inferences on the basis of a text and then granting oneself complete artistic license. To do fiction writing in the realm of non-fiction, so to speak.

Thus, according to this book, Plato did not write the Apology of Socrates and associated pieces in order to come to terms with the death of his beloved mentor, or to gleefully hint at his unwritten doctrine. He did it to show us that Socrates is mortal and to help us come to terms with our own mortality as human beings. Now I am all for wild and idiosyncratic readings, but they have to make AT LEAST as good sense of the facts as the old theories if one is to take them seriously, and not just see them as the author’s own existential striving, disguised as research.

I do not think that the author succeeds in making good sense of the facts surrounding the Platonic dialogues. For example, if the purpose of Plato’s writings is to show us how Socrates is mortal and must reassert his own dignity as mortal, rather than “remain in the realm of the goddess” and play pretend-immortal, then why is Socrates portrayed as a god-like figure in many of the Platonic dialogues? The author’s argument goes out on a limb while failing to make sense of the basest of facts!

The section on Plato feels artificial and out of context, as if plastered onto the back of the book, rather than reading like an integral part of the book itself. The work would have been stronger if this last section had been omitted.

EU gentager historien

I det 14. århundrede skrev den arabiske historiker og filosof Ibn Khaldun som følger: “Man bør være sig bevidst om, at når en statsmagt først grundlægges, så opnår den store skatteindtægter med lave skattesatser. Men som tiden går, vil en statsmagt opleve, at højere og højere skattesatser blot vil føre til lavere og lavere indtægter fra beskatningen.”

Hvad Ibn Khaldun havde opdaget, var en tidlig version af Laffer-kurven, som er opkaldt efter den amerikanske økonom Arthur Laffer: Når skatterne i en stat bliver for høje, så dæmper de den økonomiske aktivitet i den givne stat for til sidst at føre frem til den situation, at højere skatter giver færre penge i kassen.

Ibn Khaldun var dog ikke den eneste filosof, som havde opdaget Laffer-kurven før Arthur Laffer: I både de kinesiske og osmanniske storriger havde kloge hoveder ligeså observeret, at efterhånden som flere og flere skatter blev lagt over på de erhvervsdrivendes skuldre, des mere synes de mægtige imperier at fattes penge.

Købmænd eller embedsmænd

Undertiden er et imperium heldigt, idet det lytter til sine købmænd, sådan som det Britiske Imperium havde for vane. Men langt oftere vil det være sådan, at et givent imperium i stedet lytter til sine embedsmænd, som man gjorde med de osmanniske vizir-embedsmænd, eller med det kinesiske Ming-dynastis navnkundige mandariner.

Forskellen er essentiel: Hvor en købmand typisk kan sætte sig i en anden handelsdrivendes sted, så har embedsmænd alle dage været et produkt af staten, og de har det derfor med at se den private sektor som fodnoter til staten. De forstår ikke, at velstanden i den private sektor skabes efter helt andre spilleregler end i det offentlige, og følgelig er embedsværkets værktøjskasse til at hjælpe de private virksomheder typisk helt forfejlet: Virksomhedsstøtte, offentlige satsninger på udvalgte industrier eller told og særlovgivning, som forgylder udvalgte virksomheder.

Danmark og EU står i dag i den situation, at at højere og højere skattesatser for længst er begyndt at føre til lavere og lavere afkast. Vi satser på en hær af statssanktionerede økonomiske planlæggere, inspektører, og nævn og kontrollanter som til stadighed griber strammere fat om det private erhvervsliv med henblik på at vride hver en ekstra krone ud af dem. Europas nationalstater fattes penge, og de har valgt at lytte til deres embedsmænd og ignorere deres købmænd.

Staten er blevet for stor

Men hvis ovenstående analyse er korrekt, hvorfor sætter vi så ikke skatterne ned, så vi kan vende tilbage til Ibn Khalduns tidlige fase, hvor lave skatter og høj økonomisk vækst går hånd i hånd? Det gør vi ikke. Det kan vi ikke, fordi staten er blevet for stor: Den har pådraget sig høje faste udgifter og en storstilet gæld. For hver gang Storbritanniens private erhvervsdrivende tjener 100 kr., så indkræves de 46 af dem i skatter og afgifter. I Danmark ligger det tilsvarende tal over 50 kr. Penge, som kunne være gået til vækst og innovation i ervhervslivet, bliver i stedet inddraget af statens embedsmænd, og brugt til at honorere statens høje udgiftsniveau

Genudgiv Kierkegaard på nudansk

Af Ryan Smith

Kierkegaard på litteraturens kirkegård Weekendavisens Anna Libak har for skade lagt sig ud med den gode smags apostle, idet hun i WA 11. januar har fremsat det ganske fornuftige forslag, at der kunne være værdi i at genudgive Kierkegaards kringlede og arkaiske skriverier på nudansk.

200px-Kierkegaard Fra modstanderne forlyder flere argumenter. Blandt andet det, at man ikke kan udtrykke så righoldige tanker uden så knudret et sprog. Hertil er der vel kun at indvende, at den politiske filosof Machiavelli formår at udtrykke komplekse og fremsynede tanker i sprog, som er klart, ja nærmest barnligt simpelt.

Et andet argument fra ancestralisterne lyder, at tonen, “den spøgefulde, lette ironi” i Kierkegaards skriverier vil forsvinde i en nudansk genudgivelse. Det har kritikerne muligvis ret i, men her må man spørge sig selv, om man vitterligt ikke kæmper for andet end tonen? Hvis det, der er tilbage, når ‘tonen’ og de øvrige kosmetiske lag er skrællet bort, ikke er værd at beskæftige sig med, så giver det selvfølgelig fin mening, at de, der beskæftiger sig med Kierkegaard, modsætter sig en genudgivelse. Men offentligheden fortjener, at man toner rent flag.

”Ved enhver oversættelse, er der ting, der går tabt,” skriver Libaks kritikere. De har altså indset sagens kerne, men skynder sig hastigt videre fra denne erkendelse. For at dvæle ved den for længe ville få dem til at indse, at der ikke findes nogen rationel skillelinje for, hvornår sådan et tab er acceptabelt, og hvornår en sådan opdatering er en uacceptabel leflen for folkedybet. ”Læs dog Kierkegaard i originalen,” siger de, ”Hvorfor dog væren doven på forhånd? – Hvorfor dog på forhånd gå ud fra, at læseren ikke taler dansk, som man gjorde i 1800-tallet? Det handler om at gide!” Og således kunne man med kritikerne sige: ”Hvorfor dog være doven på forhånd? Læs dog Platon i originalen! Hvorfor dog på forhånd gå ud fra, at læseren ikke kan oldgræsk? Det handler om at gide!” Eller hvad med Lao-Tse og den navnkundige ’Tao Te Ching’? Klassisk kinesisk? Det handler om at gide!

Endelig har kritikerne et sidste argument: “At opdatere Kierkegaard ville være at behandle hans skriverier som en kriminalroman,” siger de. ”Og Kierkegaard er ikke en kriminalroman.” Men hør, er Kant og Hume en kriminalroman? Er Schopenhauer? Alle disse tænkere genskrev på et tidspunkt i deres karriere deres værker i mindre knudrede udgaver, og deres hovedværker er ikke gået i glemmebogen derved – snarere tværtimod. Der er med andre ord intet tabt ved at realisere Libaks forslag om Kierkegaard i en mere moderne udgave – undtagen for de få, som allerede har postet ressourcer i at forstå det, som med Libaks forslag kunne blive almeneje.

Was Xenophanes a Monist or a Monotheist?

xenophanes Should Xenophanes be read as a monist or a monotheist? It seems that the surviving fragments of his thought can lend itself to either interpretation, with but a few modifications. And the ancient sources are also mixed on this matter. Thus we are faced with a doxographical split with some writers believing that Xenophanes was a monist in the Eleatic tradition along with Parmenides and Zeno and others beliveing that Xenophanes was a monotheist, writing in a religious tradition.

Writers who believe that Xenophanes was a philosophical monist: Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eduard Zeller, A.H. Armstrong, and Plato*

* Plato’s support for this interpretation may not have been intended as serious by Plato. It may have been a “jesting” remark, as Barnes calls it.

On the other hand, the writers who interpret Xenophanes as a monotheist are: Hippolytus.

And finally, we have the sources which lend themselves to either interpretation: Simplicius, Cicero, Pseudo-Galen, the Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias, Jonathan Barnes, M. Schofield

Our view here, as inspired by Thomas McEvilley, is that Xenophanes’ thought presents a religious version of a philosophical monism and so that he is not a monotheist in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic sense of the term, but who identifies the oneness and totality of philosophical monism with the divine, not unlike what Spinoza would later do.

Review of: Quiet: The power of introverts in a world that can’t stop talking

quiet-the-power-of-introverts-in-a-world-that-can-t-stop-talking-by-susan-cain Susan Cain now has 500+ reviews of her book on “introversion.” Seems she really hit the jackpot and has made quite the sum from it. But the book is problematic, to say the least.
Its really more about stress management and (hyper)sensitivity than it is about introversion. Which is kind of weird as she claims to have researched introversion for seven years. She also engages in the “E vs. I” game, implying that extroverts caused the financial crisis (!) (!!) (!!!) (!!!!!!)

Then, some of the “research” that she reports in the book she reports is wrong (introverts are afraid of giving presentations -> No!) and at other times, the research is overplayed/construed and “interpreted” in a different direction than what the sources actually said.

Basically, my take is that she is high in neuroticism and hypersensitive. She then writes about how introversion equals shyness and sensitivity for 300 pages. As several people have remarked, she is not even likely to be an introvert herself, which is probably the reason that her understanding is so poor.

The thought presents itself that books such as this one is not really about E/I at all, but about giving people who, for various reasons, feel bad about themselves a cushion; a narrative for themselves where they are reassured that they are secretly better than others.

I will say that the book was nicely written, though.

Keynes som figenblad

Forbrugspolitik og voksende offentlig gæld er yt. Men hvad gør man så, når man synes, at staten skal blive ved med at vokse? Man undlader at kalde sig selv socialist – man anvender Keynes som figenblad.

Af Ryan Smith, journalist og forfatter

To økonomer sidder og får sig en øl: ”Har du hørt, at min kone er keynesianer?” siger den ene til den anden. ”Jo, hun har altid travlt med at spendere sig ud af en depression.”

Den pointe, der ubesværet byder sig til, når man analyserer ovenstående vittighed er, at mange af de debattører, der i dag går rundt og kalder sig keynesianere, i virkeligheden gør det af opportunisme. Som med konen i vittigheden ovenfor, så holder disse debattører mægtig meget af forbrug, og det altså uden at de nødvendigvis har sat sig synderligt ind i Keynes’ tanker.

Ikke desto mindre går de dog omkring og kræver ”keynesianske” løsninger. Snart på det ene og snart på det andet. ”Keynes” er blevet det magiske ord. Det saglighedsskabende figenblad, som man kan smykke sig med for at lede fokus væk fra, at det, man egentlig ønsker, er en offentlig sektor, der helst skal være så stor som muligt. Et synspunkt, der ikke har meget at gøre med Keynes’ egen idé om at øge det offentlige forbrug som et midlertidigt tiltag i krisetider.

Med ufrivillig hjælp fra Keynes og fra figenbladets sagliggørende slør er det således kommet i stand, at hvad der før hed socialisme, nu om dage har det med at blive kaldt keynesianisme. Men det er falsk varebetegnelse, og figenbladets bedrag bliver tydeligt ved, at Keynes ikke selv var socialist: Keynes skrev uden blusel om socialismen som en doktrin for ”ulogiske og sløvsindige” mennesker, og for Keynes var det et mysterium, hvordan intelligente mennesker dog kunne tro på de rødes ammestuefortællinger om klassekamp og udbytning af arbejderen. I Keynes’ verden var den slags blot barnligt nonsens.

Keynes var altså ikke socialist. Han var økonom, uddannet i klassikerne på Eton og Cambridge, og således en mand der med indsigt i økonomernes læresætning om de såkaldte ’komparative fordele’ forstod, hvorfor international frihandel i udgangspunktet er en ganske god idé.  Ganske vist nåede Keynes at skrive sig ind i adskillige (og indbyrdes modstridende) holdninger til frihandel i løbet af sin karriere, men ifølge forfatteren Hunter Lewis, der har beskæftiget sig indgående med Keynes, så holdt Keynes aldrig op med at se international frihandel som det naturlige udgangspunkt for verdensøkonomien og for et tolerant og åbent samarbejde mellem nationer.

Med denne indsigt kan vi således se, at den historiske Keynes er milevidt fra vor egen tids figenblads-keynesianere. For figenblads-keynesianere er i virkeligheden blot socialister, og socialister er på en eller anden måde er kommet frem til, at frihandel er noget farligt noget.

Hvad en given ”keynesianer” synes om frihandel, er således den perfekte lakmusprøve på, hvorvidt vedkommende er en ægte keynesianer eller en figenblads-keynesianer:  Om han (som Keynes) blot tror på øget offentligt forbrug som et midlertidigt kriseværktøj, eller om han i virkeligheden er en socialist, som har lært at sige ”Keynes” som en slags trylleremse, der kan maskere hans kærlighed til dækningsløst forbrug.

Krugman som case study

Hvis der er én person, som inkarnerer denne konflikt imellem de halv- og helstuderede keynesianere, så er det nobelpristageren Paul Krugman, som også er professor i økonomi på Princeton universitet. Her taler vi selvsamme Krugman, som også danske politikere og meningsmagere undertiden har henvist til i deres argumentation (eks. Mogens Lykketoft, Berlingske 05.08.2010, samt Lars Trier Mogensen, Politiken 03.06.2011).

Krugman har altid været keynesianer, men i den tidlige del af sin karriere (da Krugman var mere ortodoks som økonom) der var han også glødende tilhænger af frihandel. I 90’erne skrev Krugman f.eks. bogen ’Pop Internationalism’, som leverede en knusende kritik af de moderigtige venstrefløjsfolk, der, med nyopfundne og uunderbyggede ideer på plakaten, skæpper op for at modsætte sig frihandel.

Vi kender også disse ”pop-internationalister” i Danmark: De er venstreorienterede typer, som gerne taler flot og længe om internationalt samarbejde og om deres bekymring for folk i den tredje verden. Men de forblommede ord falder til jorden, når de udsættes for lakmusprøven: I praksis modsætter de sig nemlig frihandel, og dermed spænder de også ben for den tredje verdens mest oplagte mulighed for nogensinde at komme til at stå på egne ben.

Ifølge Krugman er disse ”pop-internationalister” folk, som godt kan lide at fremstille sig selv som havende et globalt udsyn, men som i praksis ikke har det. Men det var alt sammen, før Krugman blev gjort til ikon for den internationale venstrefløj, der som sagt har det svært med frihandel.

Siden Krugmans kanonisering som venstrefløjsikon har han derfor ikke skullet have klinket noget: Siden da har han nemlig været ”strategisk tavs” om, hvad han egentlig mener om frihandel, hvilket er højst usædvanligt for en mand, der vel bedst kan beskrives som en art ’økonomernes Robespierre’: Som en bulldog af en økonom, der altid har stået klar med en passioneret brandtale til fordel for sin egen holdning og med et lige så passioneret personangreb på enhver, som der ikke lige kunne tilslutte sig hans holdning.

Der er også figenblade i realpolitikken

Indtil nu har vi mest set på debattens overordnede linjer. Men kigger vi nærmere på realpolitikken, så finder vi også her en uhæderlig tendens til at forvanske realiteterne omkring, hvad det egentlig er, der sker med det offentlige forbrug i Europa.

Først lidt kontekst: Da finanskrisen ramte, var de politiske fløje uenige om løsningen: På højrefløjen mente man, at krisen skulle håndteres ved ”at spænde livremmen ind”, dvs. ved at bruge færre penge i den offentlige sektor. Men på venstrefløjen lunede man sig istedet ved tanken om keynesiansk inspirererede ”vækstpakker” og ”kickstarts” – det vil sige ved mere gæld og et højere offentligt forbrug, hvilket i øvrigt også var, hvad S og SF gik til valg på.

(Teksten fortsætter efter billedet.)


I den forbindelse anføres det ofte fra venstreorienterede, at det borgerlige bud på en løsning ”har fejlet.” At besparrelser simpelthen ikke har virket, og at de keynesianske ”kickstarts” med gældsstiftelse og et højere offentligt forbrug derfor er påkrævet (eks. Morten Bødskov, Kristeligt Dagblad 16.02.2011, samt Henrik Herløv Lund, Avisen.dk 01.12.2011).

Men dette postulat om, at besparelser i det offentlige ikke har virket, har et problem: Det har ikke hold i virkeligheden. Det er blot endnu et figenblad, som forbrugsivrige mennesker kan holde op for deres intellektuelle ædlere dele i et forsøg på at fremvise en fernis af saglighed.

Kigger man tallene efter, sådan som den fransk-amerikanske økonom Veronique de Rugy har gjort, så viser det sig nemlig, at de offentlige besparelser, som venstrefløjen har besunget som var de ødelæggelser af bibelske dimensioner, slet ikke har fundet sted i Europa. Ifølge de Rugy så har besparelserne på de offentlige budgetter været beskedne, grænsende til det insignifikante, og nedbringelsen af den europæiske gæld er i stedet foregået ved, at Europas regeringer har ladet skatterne stige.

Ser man f.eks. på den britiske premierminister David Camerons virke, så lovede han under sin valgkamp, at han ville skære dramatisk i samtlige af de britiske ministeriers budgetter. Cameron lovede tillige, at han ville gennemføre en ”seriøs” tilbagetrækningsreform, og at han ville sætte skatterne ned. Men går man Cameron efter i bedene, så viser det sig, at virkeligheden er en anden: Det offentlige forbrug er fortsat med at stige, blot med lidt langsommere hastighed end under den nuværende regerings forgængere.

Ligeledes mener Rugy at finde samme mønster i Frankrig, Spanien, og andre europæiske lande. Ifølge de Rugy så snakker de europæiske lande om at nedbringe deres gæld gennem en blanding af skattestigninger og offentlige besparelser, men i virkeligheden er det sådan, at skattestigningerne indtræffer, mens sparrelserne på de offentlige budgetter forbliver ved snakken

Såvel på debattens overordnede linier som på den konkrete realpolitik ser vi altså, at debatten om Keynes ikke er hæderlig, men at hans navn bliver anvendt som et figenblad, der skal maskere det bagvedliggende ønske om permanent vokseværk i den offentlige sektor.

Et ønske, som Keynes selv ville have været imod.

Heraclitus: Greek Text and English Translation

Original Greek text : Diels; English translation : John Burnet (1912)

Click to open .pdf: Heraclitus

Further text on Heraclitus:

The Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition (1910–1911) : HERACLITUS (Ἡράκλειτος; c. 540-475 B.C.), Greek philosopher, was born at Ephesus of distinguished parentage. Of his early life and education we know nothing; from the contempt with which he spoke of all his fellow-philosophers and of his fellow-citizens as a whole we may gather that he regarded himself as self-taught and a pioneer of wisdom. So intensely aristocratic (hence his nickname ὀχλολοίδορος, “he who rails at the people”) was his temperament that he declined to exercise the regal-hieratic office of βασιλεύς which was hereditary in his family, and presented it to his brother. It is probable, however, that he did occasionally intervene in the affairs of the city at the period when the rule of Persia had given place to autonomy; it is said that he compelled the usurper Melancomas to abdicate. From the lonely life he led, and still more from the extreme profundity of his philosophy and his contempt for mankind in general, he was called the “Dark Philosopher” (ὁ σκοτεινός), or the “Weeping Philosopher,” in contrast to Democritus, the “Laughing Philosopher.” κακοὶ μάρτυρες Heraclitus is in a real sense the founder of metaphysics. Starting from the physical standpoint of the Ionian physicists, he accepted their general idea of the unity of nature, but entirely denied their theory of being. The fundamental uniform fact in nature is constant change (πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει); everything both is and is not at the same time. He thus arrives at the principle of Relativity; harmony and unity consist in diversity and multiplicity. The senses are “bad witnesses” (κακοὶ μάρτυρες); only the wise man can obtain knowledge. To appreciate the significance of the doctrines of Heraclitus, it must be borne in mind that to Greek philosophy the sharp distinction between subject and object which pervades modern thought was foreign, a consideration which suggests the conclusion that, while it is a great mistake to reckon Heraclitus with the materialistic cosmologists of the Ionic schools, it is, on the other hand, going too far to treat his theory, with Hegel and Lassalle, as one of pure Panlogism. Accordingly, when he denies the reality of Being, and declares Becoming, or eternal flux and change, to be the sole actuality, Heraclitus must be understood to enunciate not only the unreality of the abstract notion of being, except as the correlative of that of not-being, but also the physical doctrine that all phenomena are in a state of continuous transition from non-existence to existence, and vice versa, without either distinguishing these propositions or qualifying them by any reference to the relation of thought to experience. ” Every thing is and is not'”; all things are, and nothing remains. So far he is in general agreement with Anaximander (q.v.), but he differs from him in the solution of the problem, disliking, as a poet and a mystic, the primary matter which satisfied the patient researcher, and demanding a more vivid and picturesque element. Naturally he selects fire, according to him the most complete embodiment of the process of Becoming, as the principle of empirical existence, out of which all things, including even the soul, grow by way of a quasi condensation, and into which all things must in course of time be again resolved. But this primordial fire is in itself that divine rational process, the harmony of which constitutes the law of the universe (see LOGOS). Real knowledge consists in comprehending this all-pervading harmony as embodied in the manifold of perception, and the senses are “bad-witnesses,” because they apprehend phenomena, not as its manifestation, but as “stiff and dead.” In like manner real virtue consists in the subordination of the individual to the laws of this harmony as the universal reason wherein alone true freedom is to be found.” The law of things is a law of Reason Universal (λόγος), but most men live as though they had a wisdom of their own.” Ethics here stands to sociology in a close relation, similar, in many respects, to that which we find in Hegel and in Comte. For Heraclitus the soul approaches most nearly to perfection when it is most akin to the fiery vapour out of which it was originally created, and as this is most so in death, ” while we live our souls are dead in us, but when we die our souls are restored to life.” The doctrine of immortality comes prominently forward in his ethics, but whether this must not be reckoned with the figurative accommodation to the popular theology of Greece which pervades his ethical teaching, is very doubtful. The school of disciples founded by Heraclitus flourished for long after his death, the chief exponent of his teaching being Cratylus. A good deal of the information in regard to his doctrines has been gathered from the later Greek philosophy, which was deeply influenced by it. BIBLIOGRAPHY.—The only authentic extant work of Heraclitus is the περὶ φύσεως. The best edition (containing also the probably spurious Ἐπιστολαί) is that of I. Bywater, Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae (Oxford, 1877); of the epistles alone by A. Westermann (Leipzig, 1857). See also in A. H. Ritter and L. Preller’s Historia philosophiae Graecae (8th ed. by E. Wellmann, 1898); F. W. A. Mullach, Fragm. philos. Graec. (Paris, 1860); A. Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of Greece (1898); H. Diels, Heraklit von Ephesus (2nd ed., 1909), Greek and German. English translation of By water’s edition with introduction by G. T. W. Patrick (Baltimore, 1889). For criticism see, in addition to the histories of philosophy, F. Lassalle, Die Philosophie Herakleitos’ des Dunklen (Berlin, 1858; 2nd ed., 1892), which, however, is too strongly dominated by modern Hegelianism; Paul Schuster, Heraklit von Ephesus (Leipzig, 1873); J. Bernays, Die heraklitischen Briefe (Berlin, 1869); T. Gomperz, Zu Heraclits Lehre und den Uberresten seines Werkes (Vienna, 1887), and in his Greek Thinkers (English translation, L. Magnus, vol. i. 1901); J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (1892); A. Patin, Heraklits Einheitslehre (Leipzig, 1886); E. Pfleiderer, Die Philosophie des Heraklit us von Ephesus im Lichte der Mysterienidee (Berlin, 1886); G. T. Schäfer, Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus und die moderne Heraklilforschung (Leipzig, 1902); Wolfgang Schultz, Studien zur antiken Kultur, i.; Pythagoras und Heraklit (Leipzig, 1905); O. Spengler, Heraklit. Eine Studie ilber den energetischen Grundgedanken seiner Philosophie (Halle, 1904); A. Brieger, “Die Grundzüge der heraklitischen Physik ” in Hermes, xxxix. (1904) 182-223, and “Heraklit der Dunkle” in Neue Jahrb. f. das klass. Altertum (1904), p. 687. For his place in the development of early philosophy see also articles IONIAN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY and LOGOS. Ancient authorities: Diog. Laert. ix.; Sext. Empiric, Adv. mathem. vii. 126, 127, 133; Plato, Cratylus, 402 A and Theaetetus, 152 E; Plutarch, Isis and Osiris, 45, 48; Arist. Nic. Eth. vii. 3, 4; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, v. 599, 603 (ed. Paris). (J. M. M.)

Parmenides: Greek Text and English Translation

Original Greek text : Diels; English translation : John Burnet (1892)

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The Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition (1910–1911) : PARMENIDES OF ELEA (Velia) in Italy, Greek philosopher. According to Diogenes Laertius he was “in his prime” 504-500 B.C., and would thus seem to have been born about 539. Plato indeed (Parmenides, 127 B) makes Socrates see and hear Parmenides when the latter was about sixty-five years of age, in which case he cannot have been born before 519; but in the absence of evidence that any such meeting took place this may be regarded as one of Plato’s anachronisms. However this may be, Parmenides was a contemporary, probably a younger contemporary, of Heraclitus, with whom the first succession of physicists ended, while Empedocles and Anaxagoras, with whom the second succession of physicists began, were very much his juniors. Belonging, it is said, to a rich and distinguished family, Parmenides attached himself, at any rate for a time, to the aristocratic society or brotherhood which Pythagoras had established at Croton; and accordingly one part of his system, the physical part, is apparently Pythagorean. To Xenophanes, the founder of Eleaticism—whom he must have known, even if he was never in any strict sense of the word his disciple—Parmenides was, perhaps, more deeply indebted, as the theological speculations of that thinker unquestionably suggested to him the theory of Being and Not-Being, of the One and the Many, by which he sought to reconcile Ionian “monism,” or rather “henism,” with Italiote dualism. Tradition relates that Parmenides Lamed laws for the Eleates, who each year took an oath to observe them. Parmenides embodied his tenets in a short poem, called Nature, of which fragments, amounting in all to about 160 lines, have been preserved in the writings of Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius and others. It is traditionally divided into three parts—the “Proem,” “Truth” τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν), and ” Opinion” (τὰ πρὸς δόξαν). In “Truth,” starting from the formula ” the Ent (or existent) is, the Nonent (or non-existent) is not,” Parmenides attempted to distinguish between the unity or universal element of nature and its variety or particularity, insisting upon the reality of its unity, which is therefore the object of knowledge, and upon the unreality of its variety, which is therefore the object, not of knowledge, but of opinion. In “Opinion ” he propounded a theory of the world of seeming and its development, pointing out however that, in accordance with the principles already laid down, these cosmological speculations do not pretend to anything more than probability. In spite of the contemptuous remarks of Cicero and Plutarch about Parmenides’s versification, Nature is not without literary merit. The introduction, though rugged, is forcible and picturesque; and the rest of the poem is written in a simple and effective style suitable to the subject. Proem.—In the “Proem” the poet describes his journey from darkness to light. Borne in a whirling chariot, and attended by the daughters of the sun, he reaches a temple sacred to an unnamed goddess (variously identified by the commentators with Nature, Wisdom or Themis), by whom the rest of the poem is spoken. He must learn all things, she tells him, both truth, which is certain, and human opinions; for, though in human opinions there can be no “true faith,” they must be studied notwithstanding for what they are worth. Truth.—”Truth” begins with the declaration of Parmenides’s principle in opposition to the principles of his predecessors. There are three ways of research, and three ways only. Of these, one asserts the non-existence of the existent and the existence of the non-existent [i.e. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes suppose the single element which they respectively postulate to be transformed into the various sorts of matter which they discover in the world around them, thus assuming the non-existence of that which is elemental and the existence of that which is non-elemental]; another, pursued by ” restless ” persons, whose ” road returns upon itself,” assumes that a thing “is and is not,” “is the same and not the same ” [an obvious reference, as Bernays points out in the Rheinisches Museum, vii. 114 seq., to Heraclitus, the philosopher of flux]. These are ways of error, because they confound existence and non-existence. In contrast to them the way of truth starts from the proposition that ” the Ent is, the Nonent is not.” On the strength of the fundamental distinction between the Ent and the Nonent, the goddess next announces certain characteristics of the former. The Ent is uncreated, for it cannot be derived either from the Ent or from the Nonent; it is imperishable, for it cannot pass into the Nonent; it is whole, indivisible, continuous, for nothing exists to break its continuity in space; it is unchangeable [for nothing exists to break its continuity in time]; it is perfect, for there is nothing which it can want; it never was, nor will be, but only is; it is evenly extended in every direction, and therefore a sphere, exactly balanced; it is identical with thought [i.e. it is the object, and the sole object, of thought as opposed to sensation, sensation being concerned with variety and change]. As then the Ent is one, invariable and immutable, all plurality, variety and mutation belong to the Nonent. Whence it follows that all things to which men attribute reality, generation and destruction, being and not-being, change of place, alteration of colour are no more than empty words. Opinion.—The investigation of the Ent [i.e. the existent unity, extended throughout space and enduring throughout time, which reason discovers beneath the variety and the mutability of things] being now complete, it remains in “Opinion” to describe the plurality of things, not as they are, for they are not, but as they seem to be. In the phenomenal world then, there are, it has been Thought [and Parmenides accepts the theory, which appears to be of Pythagorean origin], two primary elements—namely, fire, which is gentle, thin, homogeneous, and night, which is dark, thick, heavy. Of these elements [which, according to Aristotle, were, or rather were analogous to, the Ent and the Nonent respectively] all things consist, and from them they derive their several characteristics. The foundation for a cosmology having thus been laid in dualism, the poem went on to describe the generation of “earth and sun, and moon and air that is common to all, and the milky way, and furthest Olympus, and the glowing stars”; but the scanty fragments which have survived suffice only to show that Parmenides regarded the universe as a series of concentric rings or spheres composed of the two primary elements and of combinations of them, the whole system being directed by an unnamed goddess established at its centre. Next came a theory of animal development. This again was followed by a psychology, which made thought [as well as sensation, which was conceived to differ from thought only in respect of its object] depend upon the excess of the one or the other of the two constituent elements, fire and night. ” Such, opinion tells us, was the generation, such is the present existence, such will be the end, of those things to which men have given distinguishing names.” In the truism “the Ent is, the Nonent is not, ὄν ἔστι, μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι, Parmenides breaks with his predecessors, the physicists on the Ionian succession. Asking themselves—What is the material universe, they had replied respectively—It is water, It is μεταξύ τι, It is air, It is fire. Thus, while their question meant, or ought to have meant, What is the single element which underlies the apparent plurality of the material world? their answers, Parmenides conceived, by attributing to the selected element various and varying qualities, reintroduced the plurality which the question sought to eliminate. If we would discover that which is common to all things at all times, we must, he submitted, exclude the differences of things, whether simultaneous or successive. Hence, whereas his predecessors had confounded that which is universally existent with that which is not universally existent, he proposed to distinguish carefully between that which is universally existent and that which is not universally existent, between ὄν and μὴ ὄν. The fundamental truism is the epigrammatic assertion of this distinction. In short, the single corporeal element of the Ionian physicists was, to borrow a phrase from Aristotle, a permanent οὐσία having πάθη which change; but they either neglected the πάθη or confounded them with the οὐσία. Parmenides sought to reduce the variety of nature “to a single material element; but he strictly discriminated the inconstant πάθη from the constant οὐσία, and, understanding by “existence” universal, invariable, immutable being; refused to attribute to the πάθη anything more than the semblance of existence. Having thus discriminated between the permanent unity of nature and its superficial plurality, Parmenides proceeded to the separate investigation of the Ent and the Nonent. The universality of the Ent, he conceived, necessarily carries with it certain characteristics. It is one; it is eternal; it is whole and continuous, both in time and in space; it is immovable and immutable; it is limited, but limited only by itself; it is evenly extended in every direction, and therefore spherical. These propositions having been reached, apart from particular experience, by reflection upon the fundamental principle, we have in them, Parmenides conceived, a body of information resting upon a firm basis and entitled to be called ” truth.” Further, the information thus obtained is the sum total of “truth”; for, as “existence” in the strict sense of the word cannot be attributed to anything besides the universal element, so nothing besides the universal element can properly be said to be “known.” If Parmenides’s poem had had “Being” for its subject it would doubtless have ended at this point. Its subject is, however, “Nature”; and nature, besides its unity, has also the semblance, if no more than the semblance, of plurality. Hence the theory of the unity of nature is necessarily followed by a theory of its seeming plurality, that is to say, of the variety and mutation of things. The theory of plurality cannot indeed pretend to the certainty of the theory of unity, being of necessity untrustworthy, because it is the partial and inconstant representation of that which is partial and inconstant in nature. But, as the material world includes, together with a real unity, the semblance of plurality, so the theory of the material world includes, together with the certain theory of the former, a probable theory of the latter. “Opinion” is then no mere excrescence; it is the necessary sequel to “Truth.” Thus, whereas the Ionians, confounding the unity and the plurality of the universe, had neglected plurality, and the Pythagoreans, contenting themselves with the reduction of the variety of nature to a duality or a series of dualities, had neglected unity, Parmenides, taking a hint from Xenophanes, made the antagonistic doctrines supply one another’s deficiencies; for, as Xenophanes in his theological system had recognized at once the unity of God and the plurality of things, so Parmenides in his system of nature recognized at once the rational unity of the Ent and the phenomenal plurality of the Nonent. The foregoing statement of Parmenides’s position differs from Zeller’s account of it in two important particulars. First, whereas it has been assumed above that Xenophanes was theologian rather than philosopher, whence it would seem to follow that the philosophical doctrine of unity originated, not with him, but with Parmenides, Zeller, supposing Xenophanes to have taught, not merely the unity of God, but also the unity of Being, assigns to Parmenides no more than an exacter conception of the doctrine of the unity of Being, the justification of that doctrine, and the denial of the plurality and the mutability of things. This view of the relations of Xenophanes and Parmenides is not borne out by their writings; and, though ancient authorities may be quoted in its favour, it would seem that in this case as in others, they have fallen into the easy mistake of confounding successive phases of doctrine, ” construing the utterances of the master in accordance with the principles of his scholar—the vague by the more definite, the simpler by the mere finished and elaborate theory ” (W. H. Thompson). Secondly, whereas it has been argued above that “Opinion” is necessarily included in the system, Zeller, supposing Parmenides to deny the Nonent even as a matter of opinion, regards that part of the poem which has opinion for its subject as no more than a revised and improved statement of the views of opponents, introduced in order that the reader, having before him the false doctrine as well as the true one, may be led the more certainly to embrace the latter. In the judgment of the present writer, Parmenides, while he denied the real existence of plurality, recognized its apparent existence, and consequently, however little value he might attach to opinion, was bound to take account of it : ” pour celui même qui nie l’existence réelle de la nature,” says Renouvier, ” il reste encore à faire une histoire naturelle de l’apparence et de l’illusion.” The teaching of Parmenides variously influenced both his immediate successors and subsequent thinkers. By his recognition of an apparent plurality supplementary to the real unity, he effected the transition from the ” monism ” or ” henism ” of the first physical succession to the “pluralism” of the second. While Empedocles and Democritus are careful to emphasize their dissent from “Truth,” it is obvious that “Opinion” is the basis of their cosmologies. The doctrine of the deceitfulness of “the undiscerning eye and the echoing ear” soon established itself, though the grounds upon which Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus maintained it were not those which were alleged by Parmenides. Indirectly, through the dialectic of his pupil and friend Zeno and otherwise, the doctrine of the inadequacy of sensation led to the humanist movement, which for a time threatened to put an end to philosophical and scientific speculation. But the positive influence of Parmenides’s teaching was not yet exhausted. To say that the Platonism of Plato’s later years, the Platonism of the Parmenides, the Philebus and the Timaeus, is the philosophy of Parmenides enlarged and reconstituted, may perhaps seem paradoxical in the face of the severe criticism to which Eleaticism is subjected, not only in the Parmenides, but also in the Sophist. The criticism was, however, preparatory to a reconstruction. Thus may be explained the selection of an Eleatic stranger to be the chief speaker in the latter, and of Parmenides himself to take the lead in the former. In the Sophist criticism predominates over reconstruction, the Zenonian logic being turned against the Parmenides metaphysic in such a way as to show that both the one and the other need revision: see 241 D, 244 B seq., 257 B seq., 258 D. In particular, Plato taxes Parmenides with his inconsistency in attributing (as he certainly did) to the fundamental unity extension and sphericity, so that “the worshipped ὄν is after all a pitiful μὴ ὄν” (W. H. Thompson). In the Parmenides reconstruction predominates over criticism—the letter of Eleaticism being here represented by Zeno, its spirit, as Plato conceived it, by Parmenides. Not the least important of the results obtained in this dialogue is the discovery that, whereas the doctrine of the “one” and the “many” is suicidal and barren so long as the “solitary one” and the “indefinitely many” are absolutely separated (137 C seq. and 163 B seq.), it becomes consistent and fruitful as soon as a “definite plurality ” is interpolated between them (142 B seq., 157 B seq., 160 B seq.). In short, Parmenides was no idealist, but Plato recognized in him, and rightly, the precursor of idealism. BIBLIOGRAPHY.—The fragments have been skilfully edited by H. Diels, in Parmenides Lehrgedicht, griechisch u. deutsch (Berlin, 1897), with commentary; in Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta. with brief Latin notes, critical and interpretative (Berlin, 1901); and in Die Fragmente d. Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 2nd ed., 1906), with German translation); and Diels’ text is reproduced with a helpful Latin commentary in Ritter and Preller’s Historia philosophiae graecae (8th ed., revised by E. Wellmann, Gotha, 1898). The philosophical system is expounded and discussed by E. Zeller, D. Philosophie d. Griechen (5th ed., Leipzig, 1892; Eng. trans., London, 1881); by T. Gomperz, Griechische Denker (Leipzig, 1896; Eng. trans., London, 1901); and by J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London, 1908). For the cosmology, see A. B. Krische, D. theologischen Lehren d. griechischen Denker (Gottingen, 1840). On the relations of Eleaticism and Platonism, see W. H. Thompson, “On Plato’s Sophist” in the Journal of Philology viii. 303 seq. For other texts, translations, commentaries and monographs see the excellent bibliography contained in the Grundriss d. Geschichte d. Philosophie of Überweg and Heinze 10th ed., Berlin, 1909; Eng. Trans., London, 1880). (H. JA.)