Category Archives: Filosofi

Buddhism and Taoism

Buddhism and Taoism: Almost all Chinese and Japanese Buddhism is *strongly* influenced by Taoism. When Buddhist first came to China, the monks of each religion recognized that, while there were variations, they were ultimately talking about much the same thing (“seeing the absolute, reality without distinctions, which reveals that ordinary thought is a deception.”) so there’s stories about how they would try and speak about that, which, as Alan Watts says, really cannot be spoken about, and they would sound like they were talking gibberish to everyone else. But to each other, they’d just smile in knowing recognition.

The roots of Buddhism are very formally philosophic, as you also say: “What is the nature of time?, What is the nature of the Self? What is the nature of consciousness?” Nagarjuna then eases off those speculations a bit (using philosophy to destroy philosophy), but even without speculation, Buddhism still had a serious and formal character. Taoism was always more worldly and optimistic from the beginning. I’ve read much in Chinese philosophy, and I just don’t think they ever saw the point of developing those long chains of speculation the way the Indians did: They’d much rather start with the world and just be pretty modest about their philosophizing (while still pointing forward to the same absolute as the Buddhists do). Also, though Buddhism was purged of much of its Indian roots in Chine, I think it never got rid of its serious and slightly world-denying character where everything in the world i s thought to be unsatisfactory to some degree. By comparison, the Taoists cultivate a satisfaction and more easily gives itself to a sense of appreciation, even in the seemingly “bad” (well you say the crooked tree is worse than the straight one, but when the lumberjack comes, he chops down the others, but let’s it live, so maybe the crooked tree is pretty cool after all, huh?”). 😀

If you know the vinegar Chinese tasters painting, it kind of gets at it as well: Buddha tastes the vinegar (life) and says it’s bitter. LaoTze tastes the same vinegar and says that appreciated appropriately, it can function as a condiment and therefore be “sweet.” =)

Guide til MBTI / JTI / Jungs Typelære

Hvad betyder bogstaverne?

E eller I: Hvor kommer din energi fra?

I betyder ”Introvert”
Introverte mennesker får deres energi fra at være alene i stilhed. De har svært ved afbrydelser. De føler sig mere stimulerede til at være sociale og sammen med andre, efter de har haft lange stunder for sig selv.

E betyder ”Ekstrovert”
Ekstroverte mennesker får deres energi af at være sammen med andre og ”tænke højt ud i rummet.” De føler sig mere stimulerede til at samle deres tanker og arbejde igennem, efter de har været sociale.

S eller N: Hvilke typer informationer kan du bedst lide at arbejde med?

N betyder ”iNtuitiv”
Intuitive typer elsker at arbejde med teorier og muligheder – det, der kunne være, men som ikke er. Intuitive typer hopper rundt fra ting til ting, og fra emne til emne, som en astronom med et teleskop. N-typer er i reglen meget glade for abstraktion og kan nogle gange sidde og diskutere en ting med stor entusiasme. S-typer synes nogle gange, at N typer burde teoretisere mindre og gøre mere.

S betyder ”Sansende”
S-typer elsker at arbejde med sikre fakta og detaljer. Hvis N-typer er drømmende, er S-typer realistiske. De ved, hvad der er muligt, og hvordan man gør det. S-typer kan lide diskussioner med et klart afgrænset emnefokus og bryder sig ikke op at hoppe fra mulighed til mulighed – de foretrækker planer og handling, som man ved kan blive til noget i den virkelige verden.

F eller T: Hvordan træffer du beslutninger?

T betyder ”Tænkende”
Tænke-typer træffer beslutninger på baggrund af upersonlig logik. De lægger vægt på objektive informationer og parametre og kan af og til opleves som kolde og logiske af Føle-typer. Tænke-typer anvender ofte logik som deres rettesnor, når de argumenterer. T-typer lader sig styre af hovedet.

F betyder ”Følende”
F-typer træffer beslutninger på baggrund af deres personlige værdier og opfattelser. De er fuldt ud i stand til at anvende logik, når opgaven kræver det, men deres egentlige beslutningsgrundlag ligger i værdiernes verden. På trods af navnet er føletyper ikke direkte styret af deres følelser, men snarere af deres personlige værdier og sentimenter. F-typer lader sig føre af hjertet.

J eller P: Hvordan er din livsstil?

J betyder “Vurderende”
(J kommer fra det engelske “Judging”). J-typer holder af struktur og faste planer, og de er ofte gode til at sætte ydre opgaver i system. Når man står over for en stor opgave eller et stort projekt, kan det være stressende for J-typer ikke at vide, hvem der skal gøre hvad hvornår, eller hvad det næste punkt på dagsordenen er.

P betyder “oPfattende”
P-typer foretrækker at leve deres liv tilbagelænet, spontant og fleksibelt. P-typer er ofte gode til at improvisere og til at tage tingene, som de kommer. Når en beslutning skal træffes, kan en P-type føle, at det er kvælende at skulle lægge sig fast på en given løsning, så længe muligheden for at “vente og se hvad der sker” stadig er til stede.

Buddhist Ideas Explained

You can’t, beyond a few basic things, say that *all* Buddhists believe something, since Buddhism is like all of philosophy reinvented in its own image. There are sooo many Buddhist philosophers; Nagarjuna is just the greatest one. And Nagarjuna is very important to all Buddhists except for the ones in India/Sri Lanka and some of Cambodia.

*On top of that* you have religious Buddhism and philosophical Buddhism. Supposedly, the Buddha made fun of his followers for supposing that he was immortal, but then you get other sources saying that he was uniquely divine. I guess you rarely start anything spiritual in premodern times without being deified at least a bit. Even Nagarjuna was deified as being able to speak with snake-gods, and he is pretty rational.

Karma — In Hinduism, karma is like a cosmic accountancy system, governing the cycle of birth and death. This is what most We11sterners mean when they refer to karma. Some Buddhist texts are like this too, but in Buddhism, there is no caste system. Often, when the Buddha talks about karma, he means something more akin to “activity” or “causation.” Not in the sense of Western / Aristotelian ideas, but more like a descriptor of why the world (as he sees it) becomes more and more uneven or differentiated. Karma is not so much specific actions, which give you plus and minus points, as in Hinduism, but more like accumulated causation up to this point (to pre-Nagarjuna Buddhists). So, for example, for a European girl to have blond hair, there would have to be a massive accumulation of prior karma in the universe (big bang, apes, humans, Northern Europeans, etc.) that come together to determine that. It’s like a huge backlog of causation, to which you can add your own little speck. Because everything you do (and even think) has some kind of karma as well, adding to the molehill.

This is roughly what the Buddha taught. In religious Buddhism this then becomes construed to something more like what Hinduism was; — if you do the “good” things you will get a good “result” and have an easier time reaching nirvana. But the Buddha denied this, as did several famous pre-Nagarjuna monks. It was more of a folk belief.

Nagarjuna, of course, doesn’t need karma. He does not deny or affirm it; it’s is just empty of self-existed, co-caused by the universe and the universe co-caused by it..

Reincarnation — Depends on the branch and on philosophical/religious
Buddhism. People often ask: “If there’s no self in Buddhism, what is
reborn?” To pre-Nagarjuna (philosophical) Buddhists, what’s “reborn”
is actually the karma of the things you did — your little specks of
causation you added to the molehill, even though “you” are not there
anymore. A good pointer against the religious belief that you are
somehow reborn as something higher or closer to nirvana is the
Buddha’s own assertion that he was not immortal and would not be
reborn. But people believe what they will — a Thai Buddhist once told
me, that the most virtuous things to be reborn as in his order were:
1 Man
2 White elephant
3 Woman

XD

Though Chinese/Japanese Buddhism was hugely influenced by Nagarjuna,
they tend to downplay, or even be ignorant, of it. In some ways, those
branches go back to Buddha too. But they have a wordy disposition
where many of their masters write completely upfront that rebirth is
to be understood somewhat like a log consumed by flame still leaving
ashes – Dogen Zenji (Japanese guy) says burned logs don’t go back to
being logs again XD But I think even in China and Japan, the monks
don’t really rush to correct people in need of consoling fantasies of
literal rebirth.

Morality — Many Buddhists have some kind of morality. Compassion,
don’t hurt people, don’t cheat and lie, mmmkay. However, the Buddha
does not say that these are inherent truths about the universe. He is
actually pretty good on the is/ought on this point, even though Indian
thinkers don’t really think that kind of distinction makes sense. So
he says that it is only those *who wish to end the suffering that he
is speaking of* that should embark on that morality.
So the Buddha did postulate a certain morality. It was pretty fixed
and it was the intention that mattered (like Kant). But unlike Kant,
the Buddha also varied his own conduct depending on who heard his
sermons so maybe he broke his own precepts a bit XD
At any rate, the morality part has been overturned by many (but not
all) later Buddhists (even pre-Nagarjunists). There is a strong
tradition in Buddhism of “doing good brings no rewards”; “doing good
has no intrinsic value.” Some Buddhists (especially Indians) still
stick very closely to fixed precepts, but most don’t. Like the Dalai
Lama eating meat, or the zen masters beating up their own students.
Because fixed precepts don’t square so well with increased awareness
and the “mindfulness” you get in meditation, which is the *real* point
of Buddhism.

Meditation — This is where it’s at. Anyone can meditate and Buddhists
didn’t invent meditation. They were, however, the first ones (I think)
to say that everyone (who wished to cure the ills that the Buddha was
speaking of) should meditate and that meditation was kind of the point
of the whole thing. A lot of the other beliefs are just there to
support and mix with meditation. So, you don’t have to meditate, but
on the other hand, you can never understand the Buddhist teachings
fully if you don’t. There’s a realm of “intuitive knowledge,”
sometimes called the “dharma eye” because it’s unlike any other kind
of mental activity. It has nothing specific to do with Buddhism.
Hindus, Christians, Muslims etc. have such experiences too when they
meditate or engage in meditation-like behaviors. But Buddhism is
probably the only “religion” that takes the gist of these states and
builds the majority of its philosophy around that.

Enlightenment — The Buddha was enlightened in meditation, he saw the
truth about the universe with the “dharma eye” and saw that it was
seeing this truth (“we’re all oooooneeee”) could liberate people from
“suffering.” By suffering we mean something more like the fact that
phenomenal existence is imperfect and conditioned and therefore bound
to cause dissatisfaction because we could easily imagine the imperfect
to be perfect and we get attached to the idea of wanted the phenomenal
to be perfect. To experience enlightenment is not only to see how it’s
all oooooneeee, but also to see how that order is really perfect just
as it is (so there is a ceasing of wanting and attachments). That is
why I said that in Indian philosophy, Is/ought does not make much
sense – is/seeming would make better sense where seeming is phenomenal
existence and is is nirvana.

So nirvana is not some “place” like heaven and paradise; it’s just a
glimpse, perhaps only a second-long glimpse, of the “true state of the
universe,” glimpsed through the dharma eye. And since the mental
contents of this faculty are inexpressible, they cannot form
scientific claims that conflict with scientific experiments, etc. —
all they can do is argue with scientists about what is the “is” and
what is the “seeming” on the is/seeming divide. Is it the vision of
nirvana that’s the greater truth and phenomena that are lesser, or is
nirvana a hallucination with phenomena being the truth. Some Chinese
Buddhists (Hua Yen) actually made a whole branch in the middle ages,
arguing that each truth — the spiritual and the phenomenal — were
equally important.

Oh yeah, and some Buddhist branches, such as Soto Zen, don’t regard
enlightenment as important at all. Such experiences such create a
series of new attachments, because people dream themselves back to the
moment of their “vision” instead of focusing on their meditation.
That’s where the Zen teacher breaks out the stick and hits the pupil
for not paying attention to the now 😀

“No self” claim — It means several things: It means that you don’t
have an immortal soul, as in Hinduism or some Christian theology, for
example. It also means that no part of the brain is the “self,” like
Hume also says. If you _really_ examine your mental life without
preconceptions, you just experience a bundle of thoughts, feelings,
memories, fears, etc. – the “self” is a conventional belief that is
found not to have a direct, empirical basis in the faculties of
introspection.
“Life is suffering” claim — As said above. Suffering (dhukka) is more
like imagining/expecting the conditioned phenomena of existence to be
perfect when they can’t be: “Why am I not younger/smarter/richer/more
beautiful?” To stop this, the Buddha says that “the way” is to
meditate etc. as already mentioned. But it could be debated whether he
allows for there being other ways. Certainly, original Buddhism did
allow for people to keep their original religions and be Buddhist too.

Idealist/solipsism philosophy — Only Yogacara is solipsist/idealist.
The Buddha is actually something of an empiricist where it’s the
(inherently unstable) physical entities that come together to create
the faculties of consciousness. He is not a materialist/physicalist,
but acknowledges that there’d be no consciousness without the physical
prerequisites. And he *also* hinted that reality, as we perceive it,
is co-created by the mind (although understandably, he did not exactly
say how).

Rejection of the world — the
earliest Buddhism, they sometimes had morbid practices like meditating
in graveyards, not having children, and giving up all possessions.
This was to avoid attachments to imperfect phenomena and only meditate
and think of that. But Buddha himself rejected asceticism, as do many
modern Buddhists; they say that asceticism is just as much as bias as
indulgence, so let go of both!

Om Rushdie, Rose og Charlie Hebdo

Det er egentlig sjovt, hvordan vi i dag husker Rushdie som “en vi holdt med” dengang. For går man tilbage og læser om konflikten, så var der mange lighedspunkter med nutiden: Også dengang mente mange, at manden selv var ude om det. Også dengang blev kunstnerens intentioner og værkets kunstneriske kvaliteter anset for den løftestang som kunne retfærdiggøre bogens form; kunne disse anfægtes, ja, så var der ingen grund til at tænke den ubehagelige tanke, at tusindvis af muslimer var villige til at slå forfattere, hvis bøger de aldrig havde læst, ihjel, ja, villligt lade sig fjernstyre af en psykopatisk og totalitær massemorder i Iran.

I dag huskes Satanic Verses som den “fine” Muhammed-provokation; det værk havde ægte kunsteriske kvaliteter, og det var ikke Rushdies intention at provokere. Således fremhæves Rushdie ofte som modsætningen til Kurt Westergaard, Flemming Rose og Charlie Hebdo, som jo “blot var ude på at provokere,” og som derfor ikke bør/skal/må/kan gøre brug af deres ytringsfrihed i samme grad som en forfatter, der er så proppet med dannelse, at han sveder kunstnerisk kapital.

Men faktum om Satanic Verses er, at:
– Muhammed latterliggøres og omtales nedsættende
– Muhammed sammenlignes allegorisk med Satan
– Koranen beskrives som et skrift, Muhammed selv har fundet på
– Muhammeds koners navne er navnene på prostituerede i bogen

Derfor var der i ’89-90 mange intellektuelle, ja måske endda et flertal, der opgjorde analysen som følger: “*Hvis* Satanic Verses havde haft kunstneriske kvaliteter, så ville vi have fundet kampen mod totalitær islam værd at støtte. Men da skriftet er en plat provokation, og kunstneren tydeligvis blot var ude på at dæmonisere muslimer, så er det ikke den slags, vi ønsker at blive set i selskab med.”

Og det er altså, om ikke de eksakt samme mennesker, så i hvert fald det samme segment af mainstream-intellektuelle, som i dag lægger afstand til Flemming Rose og Charlie Hebdo, men som husker Satanic Verses som noget anderledes og finere end disse.

– Det viser (selvfølgelig), at de ting, der måske virker unødvendigt provokerende og værdiløse nu, kan se helt anderledes ud om 25 år. Og endnu mere anderledes om 75, 100, og 125 år. Hvorfor skulle Sokrates egentlig provokere? Han havde jo ikke engang noget på hjerte; det tilstod han jo selv. Renset for den umiddelbare harme og krænkelse i hans samtid, kommer støtten til hans modstandere til at se tiltagende latterlig ud. Og mon ikke også det er det samme med Rushdie?

– Det afslører også (mener jeg) en fejl i ræsonnementet hos de folk, der mener, at deres støtte til aktører, der producerer krænkende værker, skal betinges af de kunstneriske meritter, som kunsteren formår at lægge for dagen: Hvis man insisterer på, at støtten til folk, der anvender deres ytringsfrihed til at krænke, skal ses på case-by-case basis, så bør man også være heeeeelt sikker på, at man har vurderet den enkelte sag korrekt. Og hvordan skulle mennesker, hvis egen dømmekraft er påvirket af, at de empatiserer med andres krænkelser og helst er fri for hele balladen med terrortrusler og fjendskaber egentlig kunne det?

Liberalisme og indvandring

Spændende artikel, selvom jeg personligt synes det er ret godt, at der er blåt fodslag lige nu.
Men jeg vil gerne lige komme med nogle bemærkninger om indvandring, for jeg mener, det er helt i overensstemmelse med liberalisme at ville kontrollere begrænsning af indvandering fra kulturer, som man ikke mener fungerer godt i ens samfund.Den Liberale tænker Karl Popper skrev i THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES følgende:

“Ubegrænset tolerance vil føre til tolerancens undergang. Hvis vi udstrækker ubegrænset tolerance endog til dem, der selv er intolerante, hvis vi ikke er parate til at forsvare et tolerant samfund imod angreb fra intolerante, så vil de tolerante blive ødelagt, og tolerancen med dem … Vi bør hævde, at enhver bevægelse, som prædiker intolerance, placerer sig uden for loven, og vi bør anskue tilskyndelse til intolerance og forfølgelse som kriminelt; på samme måde, som vi bør anskue tilskyndelse til mord eller kidnapning, eller genoplivning af slavehandel , som kriminelt.”

Den anden liberale tænker Robert Nozik skrev tilsvarende i sin ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, at et tolerant samfund må have ret til at bestemme, hvem der indvandrer og ret til at holde dem ude, der ikke passer i den model, man ønsker. Du kan ikke have frihed til at skabe et samfund med en speciel kultur og livsstil, hvis enhver kan indvandre og ødelægge det. Tænk hvis Amish folkene pludselig fik indvandring fra Banditos.
Problemet i nutidens samfund vedrører overvejende indvandring fra muslimske samfund, hvor et flertal ikke deler den udbredte vestlige tro på videnskab, retstatssbegrebet, demokrati, rationalisme, frihed og kvinders ret, mm. Disse muslimske samfund ledes helt overvejende af diktatorer, når de ikke har borgerkrig. Deres befolkning læser gennemsnitligt meget lidt, og der udtages stort set ingen patenter, ligesom der stort set aldrig udvikles nye produkter. Overordnet står 1,5 milliard muslimer nok for under 0,1% af verdens innovation.
Samtidig er der siden 9/11 begået over 20.000 islamiske terror angreb. De fleste af disse hører vi ikke om i vestlig presse, fordi de forgår i muslimske lande som del af sekteriske kampe, som i øvrigt ofte er religionskrige. Mange siger så, at dette ikke har noget med islam at gøre, men dem, der begår disse angreb siger typisk selv meget klart, at det netop har alt med islam at gøre. Så sandheden er vel, at der er mange muslimer, der ikke støtter terror, men at der også er mange, der faktisk støtter eksempelvis sharia lov, ISIS og terror, og det er umuligt at vide hvem, der er hvem. Jeg har lige læst bogen THE DIVERSITY ILLUSION fra Ed West, som analyserer, hvad der er sket i samfund, der har haft masseindvandring fra andre kulturer såsom det, vi nu er startet på.
Konklusionen, som altså er baseret på omfattende statistisk analyse, er, at befolkningerne i sådanne samfund mister deres gensidige tillid, dvs. det, man kalder “social kapital”. De får også mere kriminalitet. De skærer ned på solidariteten, bliver angste og forskanser sig. Samfundet bliver uhæderligt og sekterisk. Der opstår den såkaldte ”halo effekt” omkring indvandrer gettoer, hvor de oprindelige indbyggere, der bor tættest på indvandrerne, går fra at være tolerante til at blive fascister. Bliver indvandringen stor nok, opstår der ofte borgerkrig. Intet af dette stemmer efter min mening med de liberale idealer.

Humanioraspiralen

Med en række indlæg i engelsksprogede aviser har humanistiske forskere igen fået striden om humaniora til at blusse op. Hvorfor skal skatteyderne fortsat poste millioner i de humanistiske uddannelser? I hvilket omfang skal markedets logik styre humaniora? I hvilket omfang skal statens? Og kan humaniora overhovedet bruges til noget?

Humaniora plages af både interne og eksterne problemer. Udefra presses man af den særegne blanding af erhvervshensyn og administratorvælde, som staten påtvinger de offentlige universiteter. Det er således ikke kun i Danmark, at refrænet om forskning og faktura har lydt. ”Humaniora skal være mere erhvervsvenligt,” får fakulteterne at vide. Et notat fra den britiske regering konkluderede sågar, at universiteterne skulle minde om en art konsulenthuse, der havde til opgave at hjælpe nystartede virksomheder på fode.

Staten fortæller også de humanistiske fakulteter, at de skal ”hæve produktionen.” På dansk betyder det, at de skal få flere studerende gennem systemet, og gerne hurtigere. Således presses de humanistiske undervisere til at lade håbløse studerende bestå. Resultatet er, at der med tiden bliver flere og flere diplombærende humanister, hvis faglighed til gengæld er mindre og mindre.

På forskningssiden betyder kravet om øget produktion, at der skal publiceres mere forskning, og gerne i de tidsskrifter staten har udvalgt. Med den amerikanske filosof Rebecca Goldsteins ord produceres der ”mere og mere om mindre og mindre” – der zoomes obskønt tæt ind på det enkelte træ, men ingen har længere tid til at opmåle skoven. Ifølge den britiske professor i litteraturvidenskab Terry Eagleton er det sågar så grelt, at meget af samtidens humanistiske forskning slet og ret er ligegyldig. Ifølge Eagleton skrives der bunkevis af publikationer, der udelukkende skrives for at score point i embedsmændenes statiske systemer. I mange lande er det nemlig denne overflødighedsforskning, der afgør, hvor mange penge staten tildeler det enkelte fakultet.

Humaniora har således rigeligt med udefrakommende problemer. Men på indersiden melder flere forskere også om fallit. I mange tilfælde er de humanistiske fakulteter ikke længere kulturbærende. Ifølge den amerikanske professor i uddannelsespolitik David Steiner er den fælles kerne af kulturarv, som humaniora burde oppebære, ikke længere fælles og dermed ej heller en kerne. For at behage de studerende undervises der mange steder i Fifty Shades frem for Friedrich Nietzsche og i vampyrfiktion frem for Virgil. Det populære har erstattet det svære.

Til humanioras problemer skal også lægges den politiske ekspertise, som mange humanistiske forskere selv mener, de besidder. Således rapporterer den amerikanske professor David Clemens fra et nyligt møde i verdens største organisation for sprog- og litteraturforskere, at deltagerne havde mere travlt med at fælde moralsk dom over Israel end med at diskutere deres fag. Ligeledes konkluderede en nylig rapport fra Harvard Universitet, at humanioras rolle nu reelt ikke længere er at videreføre og forske i klassisk kulturarv, men at afdække ”skjulte magtstrukturer,” som offentligheden ikke selv er i stand til at begribe.

En udvækst af denne selvforståelse kan ses i både danske og udenlandske aviser, hvor humanistiske forskere jævnligt forsøger at belære økonomer om økonomi. Dette foregår som regel under den belejlige antagelse, at kun humanister kan ”tænke kritisk” og i dybden. Belejligheden er ikke altid til at skelne fra magelighed, da humanisten har det med at afsløre, at han ikke har sat sig ind i grundlæggende neoklassiske principper, før han fremturede med sin kritik af dem.

Ironisk nok tyder erfaringerne fra udlandet på, at jo mere humaniora forfladiger sit emnevalg og gør sig til arnested for venstreekstreme ”magtkritiske” holdninger, des mere svinder offentlighedens lyst til at finansiere de humanistiske discipliner ind. Og logisk svarer staten igen med øgede krav om ensretning og uniformering. Der må jo styr på galskaben.

I løbet af de sidste 50 år er humaniora konstant blevet omtalt som kriseplaget. Men med humanioraspiralens seneste rotation mener flere universitetsfolk, at humaniora måske vil forsvinde helt fra en række universiteter i løbet af de kommende år. Alligevel er det dog svært at tegne et entydigt billede af fremtiden: I Storbritannien og USA bløder flere humanistiske fakulteter med frafaldsrater på op til 60% i løbet af de første to år. Til gengæld konkluderer en ny rapport, at humaniora tilsyneladende har undgået krisen i Australien.

Og løsningen på humanioras krise? I den nylige runde af indlæg er det Eagleton, der kommer det nærmest. Han udpeger bureaukraternes kontrol med universiteterne som den store slyngel og slår til lyd for decentralisering og et universitært selvstyre, der ikke står til regnskab for staten. Hvem der skulle have interesse i at finansiere dét, kommer han dog ikke ind på.

America Universalis: A Republic in Concord with Nature and a Model for all Mankind

The title of this chapter is an allusion to the feeling of exceptionalism that seems to have permeated the Founding Fathers as they laid down the foundations of the American constitution. Sentiments that have been outlined in Isaac Kramnick’s essay on the Federalist Papers (Kramnick 1987). It was thought that the establishment of the American republic would finally free man from the “long shadows of feudalism” and permit him to live in accordance with himself and nature. Thus it was thought that America would be a Republic in Concord with Nature and Model for all Mankind.[1]

The view of the American Revolution taught to me as an undergraduate student of History was that the American Revolution was the philosophy of liberalism brought to political fruition. However the study of republicanist sources and the writings of professional historians, Pocock’s Machiavellian Moment above all, have made it clear to me that republicanism had just as big a part to play in the discussion surrounding the founding of the American state.[2]

Early republicanism in the United States drew heavily on the ancient Roman precedence as well as on the discussion from seventeenth century England.[3] As such, it can be said that there was a common educational and philosophical frame inside which the discussions of the founding fathers took place. The contents of this shared intellectual baggage were, of course, the precedence of the Greco-Roman world, Machiavelli, and the political philosophers of seventeenth century England.[4] To this end, we shall hopefully have made the case for the intellectual continuities outlined in the present paper. But even beyond the Federalist Papers it would be no exaggeration to say that the republican views studied in the following chapters would be representative of figures such as Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, George Washington, Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson.[5]

The American Constitution and the Federalist Papers

Since the time of the Roman Republic itself, no state has come as close to the ideal set fourth by republicanists as the United States of America. Even the framing surrounding the discussion about the American discussion is teeming with references to Roman history. Indeed the United States of America was the first realization of a large republic since the time of Rome itself and it is hard to overlook the symbolism of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay writing under the pseudonym of Publius Valerus, the founder of the Ancient Roman Republic,[6] or the iconography of America having a “Senate” on “Capitol” hill overlooking the “Tiber”,[7] just as there are numerous mentions of Rome in the Federalist Papers.[8]

The American Constitution: A Victory for “Checks & Balances”

In the overall design of the American republic the American federalists did not follow Machiavelli’s call for regal power to any notable extent (the presidency was endowed with only very few political powers). Conversely, in their on rigid insistence of checks and balances, no doubt a contributing factor to the 200 years life span of the American constitution, the American federalists not only emphasize but break with Machievalli’s notion of adaptability and dynamism.[9] As such, they were far sterner in their attitude towards the (lack of) flexibility they would permit with regards to checks and balances, certainly sterner than Machiavelli.[10] Thus the consecutive presidencies of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe were characterized by a championing and an understanding of the principle of checks and balances as an instance that served to limit the nature of government. – In regards to the historical precedence, we may thus note, that John Adams felt that while Greeks may have thought of the principle of checks & balances they had never mastered it. [11] Likewise, the founding fathers disagree with Machiavelli that the framing of a Republic’s constitution should be determined by checks and balances, rather than by the political dynamism generated by a conflict of the orders. Thus the apex of this spirit of checks and balances might be said to be embodied in the Tenth Amendment of the American Constitution:

“The powers not delegated to the United States [i.e. Federal Government] by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”[12]

The introduction of a Senate as well as a house of congress reflects the conflict of orders as it was explicitly stated to represent an aristocracy, albeit not one bestowed by birth but by merit. Thus Thomas Jefferson made his voice known saying they there existed a ‘Natural Aristocracy’.[13] This was thought to be an aristocracy of the spirit, rather than one of heredity which they – along with Machiavelli and others – condemned as harmful. Instead, the image of this ‘natural aristocracy’ seems to have been shaped by another antique idea, namely the humourism of Hippocrates and Galen.[14] Jefferson and Madison wanted for their senators men who could deliberate coolly on matter of state and act as a check against the ‘heated’ mass of public opinion that would surely gain access to the house of representatives.

The Ideal of the Yeoman

Early republicanism in the United States had a strong, somewhat idealistic focus on the Yeoman as the political citizen-ideal. This idea permeated the minds of even great thinkers like Thomas Jefferson who has been called the “philosopher sphinx” of America.[15] The Yeoman was defined as a self-owning farmer, in possession of practical common sense, and perhaps armed as the Roman farmers had been under the Republic, and as Machiavelli had envisioned it for his ideal Republic. In stressing this, the founding fathers aligned themselves clearly with both Harrington’s Oceana as well as with the historical Roman Republic.[16] The self-ownership was seen as the anti-thesis to the oppressing feudalism of the Old World, and as a bulwark against unrestrained majority rule, the maxim being that if the citizens risked loosing their personal property they would naturally be conservatively inclined politically and think twice before enforcing the political oppression of their neighbours.[17] – Thus political theorists such as Thomas Jefferson feared that American political virtue would run out along with the supply of land on the western frontier and that the eventual urbanization of the United States would ultimately lead to a strengthening of the democratic element, on behalf of the more aristocratically-aligned republicanism, as did in fact happen. But these developments could not be regarded as finalized until somewhere in the 20th century and the Yeoman-voter would remain the dominant ideal political discourse throughout the entire debate surrounding the constitution.

To this end we can compare the position of civic virtue as envision by Madison, mostly a reflection of Machiavelli’s vivere civile to the tenets of the French revolution:[18] As the latter was more of an urbanized phenomena it naturally downplayed the republican yeoman-ideal and with it the expectations of common sensical, conservative civic virtue and favoured solidarity and (attempted) fiscal equality instead; – ideals truly foreign to America’s founding fathers. In fact, Jefferson, Madison and others tended to view the American Republic as founded on Nature and thereby as constituting a break away from the artificial, inherited, feudalistic state of the Old World. To them the Republic functioned in accordance with natural law and the nature of man, whereas the French revolution set out to create a better version of man.[19] The Aristotelean/Machiavellian equality of the republic is understood as equality before the law or equality before the republic. Machiavelli recognized the dangers inherent in the extrapolation of a political mindset where the people believe that men should be equal in all respects.[20] This is undesirable as it ultimately leads to a despotism of the opinion of the majority which was also clearly recognized by Tocqueville.[21]

In relation to this view we may note that also Tocqueville observed the brisk aggression of the westward farmers. As has been described by Fernard Braudel and others, these men were not truly farmers but entrepreneurs living on the harsh frontier.[22] They did not wait for the state to approve of their fiscal aggression and lonesome ventures but took their chances and risked everything in pursuit of happiness. This, amongst other things, was what fostered American Exceptionalism.[23]

[1] Kramnick, Isaac: Commentary on The Federalist Papers, Penguin 1987 p. 13

[2] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 507

[3] Ibid.

[4] Also of course the Founding Fathers shared a common background of deism and Puritanism, knowledge of French thinkers such as Montesquieu and so on.

[5] Shalhope, Robert E.: Toward a Republican Synthesis, William and Mary Quaterly, 29

[6] Hansen, Mogens Herman: Den moderne republicanisme og dens kritik af det liberale demokrati p. 76

[7] Flower, Harriet I. et al: The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic p. 347

[8] Madison, Jay & Hamilton: The Federalist Papers: Federalist V, VI, XVIII, XXXIV, XXXVIII, XLI, LXIII, LXX, LXXV

[9] For a discussion of Machiavelli’s flexibility regarding checks and balances, see Discourse III.9

[10] Harrington does not as much deliberate on the issue of the optimum degree of rigidity regarding checks and balances as he simply over-expounds every detail of the republic’s workings.

[11] Although it lies outside the scope of this paper an interesting observation for the reader interested in the American revolution would be the parallel of the French revolution and its disregard for the principle of checks and balances and the consequences that such a republican attitude spawned. See also: Flower, Harriet I. et al: The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic p. 347

[12] Various Authors: The Constitution of the United States of America (1787)

[13] Madison, Jay & Hamilton: The Federalist Papers (Penguin 1987) p. 21

[14] Kramnick, Isaac: Commentary on The Federalist Papers, Penguin 1987 pp. 45-55

[15] Amongst others see, Joseph J. Ellis, Alfred A. Knopf, 1997: ‘American Sphinx’ as well as Kelley L. Ross, 2006: ‘The Great Republic: Presidents and States of the United States of America, and Comments on American History’ in The Proceedings of the Friesian School, Fourth Series.

[16] The Romans of Antiquity appear to have honoured the rural castes and their imagined unspoiled rural past and mistrusted civilization and urbanization which they saw as the root of Rome’s political corruption.  See Millar, Fergus: The Roman Republic in Political Thought p. 89 – Furthermore, the alignment with Harrington is no accident as American politicians, such as John Adams, had read Harrington and were familiar with his thoughts. See: Flower, Harriet I. et al: The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic pp. 348-349

[17] Madison, Jay & Hamilton: The Federalist Papers: Federalist X See also: Pocock, J.G.A.: Journal of Modern History 1981

[18] Hansen, Mogens Herman: Den moderne republikanisme og dens kritik af det liberale demokrati p. 43

[19] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 537

[20] Machiavelli, Niccolò: The Discourses I.34

[21] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 538

[22] Pocock, J.G.A.: The Machiavellian Moment p. 537

[23] See Schmidt, Regin: American Exceptionalism. Nationale Myter, historiografi og virkelighed og Braudel, Fernand: A History of Civilizations pp. 458-480

Om den buddhistiske filosof Vasubandhu

Vasubandhu var en fremtrædende buddhistisk lærer og en af de vigtigste skikkelser i udviklingen af Mahayana-buddhismen i Indien. Selvom han især er beundret af senere buddhister som medstifter af Yogacara-skolen sammen med sin halvbror Asanga, er hans præ-Yogacara værker, såsom Abhidharmakosha og hans kommentar til dette værk Abhidharmakoshabhshya, de frembringelser, der almindeligvis anses som mesterværker.

Vasubandhu Vasubandhu skrev kommentarer om mange emner, som f.eks. logik, poesi, Abhidharma-klassifikationer af fænomener, samt originale og innovative filosofiske afhandlinger. Nogle af hans skrifter har overlevet i deres oprindelige sanskrit-form, mens mange andre kun er bevaret i kinesiske og tibetanske oversættelser.

Vasubandhu var en mangesidet tænker, og hans personlighed, som det også fremgår af hans værker og hans livsførelse, viser os en mand, der ikke kun var et stort geni og en stor filosof, men også et menneske, der var fyldt med stor medfølelse.

I årene umiddelbart efter sammensætningen af hans ​​Abhidharmakoshabhashya synes Vasubandhu at have brugt meget tid på at rejse fra sted til sted. Efter at have brugt en del tid i Shakala (det moderne Sialkot i Pakistan) vandrede han sammen med sine lærere Buddhamitra og Manoratha til Ayodhya (nu Uttar Pradesh i det nordlige Indien). Dette var en by langt fra Kashmir. På dette tidspunkt i sit liv var Vasubandhu stolt af den berømmelse, han havde erhvervet på grund af sin filosofi, og han klyngede sig trofast til Hinayana-doktrinerne, hvori han var velbevandret. Han lader ikke til at have haft nogen tro på Mahayana overhovedet og benægtede, at Mahayana var en buddhistisk lære.

Vasubandhu havde op til dette tidspunkt ikke haft megen kontakt med de Yogacara-belæringer, der blev givet af hans ældre bror. Han havde måske set det omfangsrige værk Yogacarabhumi blive udarbejdet af Asanga, men dette værk synes simpelthen at have frastødt ham ved sin længde. Ifølge rapporter skulle han have sagt:

“Ak, Asanga, som er bosiddende i skoven, har praktiseret meditation i tolv år uden at have nået noget gennem denne meditation. Han har grundlagt et system så vanskeligt og besværligt, at det kun kan bæres på ryggen af en elefant.”

Asanga hørte om denne holdning og frygtede, at Vasubandhu ville bruge sine store intellektuelle evner til at underminere Mahayana. Ved at fingere sygdom var han i stand til at tilkalde Vasubandhu til Purusapura, hvor han boede. Her fandt omvendelsen af Vasubandhu til Mahayana sted.

Vasubandhu bad Asanga om at forklare sig Mahayana-belæringerne, hvorefter han straks indså, hvor overlegne Mahayana-doktrinerne var. Efter yderligere studier af disse doktriner siges det, at dybden af ​​Vasubandhus erkendelse kom til at ligne hans brors. Han kom til at skamme sig noget så grusomt over sine tidligere nedsættende bemærkninger om Mahayana. Vasubandhu ville skære sin tunge af, men afholdt sig fra at gøre dette, da Asanga fortalte ham, at han i stedet skulle bruge den til at undervise i Mahayana.

Vasubandhu kom med tiden til at anse studiet af den enorme Shatasahasrikaprajna-Paramita-sutra som værende af allerstørste betydning for buddhismen. I betragtning af at det var de tekster, der havde konverteret ham til Mahayana, kan Vasubandhus kommentarer have været hans tidligste tanker om Mahayana. Disse blev fulgt op af en række kommentarer til andre Mahayana-sutraer og afhandlinger om disse, herunder Avatamsaka-sutra, Nirvana-sutra, Vimalakirtinirdesha-sutra og Shrimaladevi-sutra. Vasubandhu komponerede også en afhandling om vijnaptimatra (Yogacara)-teori og kommenterede Mahayanasamgraha, Triratna-Gotra, Amrita-Mukha og andre Mahayana-afhandlinger.

Ifølge de tibetanske biografier om Vasubandhu var hans foretrukne sutra enten Shatasahasrikaprajna-Paramita-sutra eller Ashtasahasrika. I betragtning af at disse tekster afslører nogle de mest dybdegående indsigter i Mahayana-tænkning, er det ikke overraskende, at Vasubandhu syntes godt om dem. Da ​​Vasubandhus produktion af Mahayana-værker er enorm, skrev han efter al sandsynlighed nye afhandlinger hvert år.